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I. PROLOGUE
A WOMAN RECENTLYASKED HOW I could, in good
conscience, write an instruction book on murder.
It is my opinion that the professional hit man fills a need in
society and is, at times, the only alternativefor 'personal"justice.
Moreover, if my advice and the proven methods in this book are
followed, certainly no one will ever know.
[W]ithin the pages of this book you will learn one of the most
successful methods of operation used by an independent contractor.
Step by step you will be taken from researchto equipment selection to
job preparationto successful job completion. You will learn where to
find employment, how much to charge, and what you can, and cannot,
do with the money you earn.
[And when] [y]ou've read all the suggested material.., you
[will be] confident and competent enough to accept employment.
[When you go to commit the murder,you will need] several (at
least four or five pairs)of flesh-tone, tight-fitting surgicalgloves. If
these are not available,rubber gloves can be purchasedat a reasonable
price in the prescriptiondepartment of most drug stores in boxes of
100. You will wear the gloves when you assemble and disassembleyour
weapons as well as on the actualjob. Because the metal gun parts
cause the rubber to wear quickly, it is a good practice to change and
dispose of worn gloves several times during each operation.
[If you decide to kill your victim with a knife,] [t]he knife...
should have a six-inch blade with a serrated edge for making efficient,
quiet kills.
The knife should have a double-edged blade. This double edge,
combined with the serratedsection and six-inch length, will insure a
deep, ragged tear, and the wound will be difficult, if not impossible, to
close without prompt medical attention.
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Make your thrusts to a vital organ and twist the knife before you
withdraw it. If you hit bone, you will have to file the blade to remove
the marks left on the metal when it struck the victim's bone.
Using your six inch, serrated blade knife, stab deeply into the
side of the victim's neck and push the knife forward in a forceful
movement. This method will half decapitate the victim, cutting both his
main arteriesand wind pipe, ensuring immediate death.
[If you plan to kill your victim with a gun,] you will learn [on
the following pages] how to make, without need of special engineering
ability or expensive machine shop tools, a silencer of the highest quality
and effectiveness. The finished product attached to your 22 will be no
louder than the noise made by a pellet gun. Because it is so inexpensive
(mine cost less than twenty dollars to make), you can easily dispose of it
after job use without any great loss .... Your first silencer will require
possibly two days total to assemble ... as you carefully follow the
directions step by step. After you make a couple, it will become so easy,
so routine, that you can whip one up in just a few hours.
The following items should be assembled before you begin [to
build your silencer]:
-- Drill rod, 7/32 inch (orderfrom a machine shop if not
obtainable locally)
-- One foot of 1-1/2 inch (inside diameter)PVC tubing and two
end caps
-- One quart of fiberglass resin with hardener
-- One yard thin fiberglass mat
[List continues]
When using a small caliber weapon like the 22, it is best to
shoot from a distance of three to six feet. You will not want to be at
pointblank range to avoid having the victim's blood splatteryou or
your clothing.At least three shots should be fired to ensure quick and
sure death.
[If you plan to kill your victim from a distance,] use a rifle with
a good scope and silencer and aim for the head--preferably the eye
sockets if you are a sharpshooter.Many people have been shot
repeatedly, even in the head, and survived to tell about it.
To test your guns and ammunition, set up a sheet of quarterinch plywood at distances of two to seven yards maximum for your
pistol, and twenty to sixty yards maximum for your rifle. Check for
penetrationof bullets at each range. Quarter-inchplywood is only a
little stronger than the human skull.

244

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:241

If the serial number is on the barrelof the gun, grinding deeply
enough to remove it may weaken the barrel to the point that the gun
could explode in your face when fired. To make these numbers
untraceable,[instructionsfollow].
[After shootingyour victim] run a [specified tool] down the bore
of the gun to change the ballistic markings. Do this even though you
intend to discard the crime weapon.... If, for some reason, you just
can't bear to part with your weapon.., alter the [specified parts of the
gun according to the directionsthat follow].
[If you plan to kill your victim with a fertilizer bomb,] purchase
a fifty pound bag of regulargardenfertilizer from your garden center
[and follow these detailed instructionsfor constructing the bomb].
Extend the fuse and light....
[In order to dispose of a corpse,] you can simply cut off the head
after burying the body. Take the head to some deserted location, place a
stick of dynamite in the mouth, and blow the telltale dentition to
smithereens!After this, authorities can't use the victim's dental records
to identify his remains. As the body decomposes, fingerprints will
disappearand no real evidence will be left from which to make positive
identification. You can even clip off the fingertips and bury them
separately.
If you choose to sink the corpse, you must first make several
deep stabs into the body's lungs (from just under the rib cage) and
belly. This is necessary because gases released during decomposition
will bloat these organs, causing the body to rise to the surface of the
water.
The corpse should be weighted with the standardconcrete
blocks, but it must be wrapped from head to toe with heavy chain as
well, to keep the body from separatingand floating in chunks to the
surface. After the fishes and naturalelements have done their work, the
chain will drag the bones into the muddy sediment....
If you bury the body, again deep stab wounds should be made to
allow the gases to escape. A bloating corpse will push the earth up as it
swells. Pour in lime to prevent the horrible odor of decomposition, and
lye to make that decomposition more rapid.
[After you killed your first victim,] you felt absolutely nothing.
And you are shocked by the nothingness. You had expected this
moment to be a spectacularpoint in your life. You had wondered if you
would feel compassion for the victim, immediate guilt, or even
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experience direct intervention by the hand of God. But you weren't even
feeling sickened by the sight of the body.
After you have arrived home the events that took place take on a
dreamlike quality. You don't dwell on them. You don't worry. You
don't have nightmares. You don't fear ghosts. When thoughts of the hit
go through your mind, it's almost as though you are recallingsome
show you saw on television.
By the time you collect the balance of your contract fee, the
doubts and fears of discovery have faded. Those feelings have been
replaced by cockiness, a feeling of superiority,a new independence and
self-assurance.
Your experience in facing death head-on has taught you about
life. You have the power and ability to stand alone. You no longer need
a reason to kill.
Start now in learning to control your ego. That means, above
all, keeping your mouth shut! You are a man. Without a doubt, you
have proved it. You have come face to face with death and emerged the
victor through your cunning and expertise. You have dealt death as a
professional. You don't need any second or third opinions to verify your
manhood.
Then, some day, when you've done and seen it all; when there
doesn 't seem to be any challenge left or any new frontier left to conquer,
you might just feel cocky enough to write a book about it.I
II. INTRODUCTION
Criminal liability for aiding and abetting constitutes an ancient
doctrine of criminal law. 2 Commentators describing English law at
the beginning of the fourteenth century recognized that "the law of
homicide is quite wide enough to comprise . . . those who have
'procured, counseled, commanded or abetted' the felony.. .for it is

1.
The foregoing passages from Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors
were among those selected by the Fourth Circuit panel in Rice v.PaladinEnterprises, Inc., as
representative, both in substance and presentation, of the instructions in Hit Man. 128 F.3d
233, 235-39 (4th Cir. 1997). The court stated that the quoted passages "are but a small fraction
of the total number of instructions that appear in the 130-page manual. The court has even felt
it necessary to omit portions of these few illustrative passages in order to minimize the danger to
the public from their repetition herein." Id. at 239 n.1.
2.
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994).
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colloquially said that he sufficiently kills who advises." 3 In 1909,
Congress enacted a general aiding and abetting statute applicable to
4
all federal criminal offenses.
Civil liability for aiding and abetting, however, represents a
very underdeveloped theory within common law tort.5 Courts have
stated, seemingly in jest, that precedents in this area of law are
"largely confined to isolated acts of adolescents in rural society." 6
Notwithstanding the banter, there is recognition that "the
implications of tort law in this area as a supplement to the criminal
justice process and possibly as a deterrent to criminal activity cannot
be casually dismissed. ' 7 With continued development, the theory of
civil aiding and abetting presents the availability of an improved law
of torts, better able to provide justice for private victims of crime and
8
tort.
Recent cases illustrate the ability of the civil theory of aiding
and abetting to reach conduct that likely would not be privately
actionable otherwise. Two such cases are Rice v. PaladinEnterprises,
Inc. 9 and Boim v. QuranicLiteracy Institute.10
In Rice, the Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment does
not pose a bar to civil liability for aiding and abetting criminal
conduct, specifically murder for hire.'
James Perry, a neophyte hit
man, brutally murdered Mildred Horn, her eight-year-old quadriplegic

3.
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (citing Pollock & Maitland, Vol.
II, p. 507).
4.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 181 (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2)).
5.
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
6.
Id. The only somewhat developed area of civil liability involves statutory securities
violation cases. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 181. However, this area of the law was stopped in its
tracks by Central Bank, in which the Supreme Court held that the 1933 Securities Act does not
permit civil liability for aiding and abetting. Id. As a result, the only developed area of civil
aiding and abetting no longer provides a cause of action. Still, cases prior to Central Bank that
recognize civil aiding and abetting under the 1934 Exchange Act provide many of the principles
underlying civil aiding and abetting generally.
7.
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 489.
8.
See id. (predicting that tort law will evolve and be adapted for aiding and abetting
cases, just as it evolved in products liability cases). As discussed in Part III, infra, criminal
liability provides justice on behalf of society, which is thought to be a collective victim of criminal
conduct, whereas tort provides justice via a private right of action for a particular plaintiff's legal
injury.
9.
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
10. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
11. 128 F.3d at 241. The First Amendment was held to bar claims of damages allegedly
resulting from incitement by a violent movie and video games in the infamous Columbine High
School shooting. Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279-1281 (D. Colo.
2002).
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son Trevor, and Trevor's nurse, Janice Saunders. 12 Perry shot Mildred
Horn and Saunders through the eyes at close range and strangled
Trevor Horn. 13 Perry did not know his victims, for Perry acted as a
contract killer, or "hit man," hired by Mildred Horn's ex-husband,
Lawrence Horn.14 Lawrence Horn's motive for contracting the murder
of his family was that he would receive the $2 million that his young
son had received in settlement for the injuries that rendered him
15
quadriplegic for life.
In the course of soliciting, preparing for, and committing the
triple homicide, Perry meticulously followed the detailed factual
instructions of how to commit murder and become a professional killer
outlined in Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent
Contractors.16 The relatives and representatives of the three victims
instituted a wrongful death action against Paladin Enterprises, the
publisher of Hit Man, alleging that Paladin aided and abetted Perry in
the commission of his murders through the publication of the book's
killing instructions. 17 Paladin defended solely on First Amendment
grounds. To that end, Paladin stipulated, for purposes of summary
judgment, that (1) Perry followed the book; (2) Paladin's marketing of
the book was "intended to attract and assist criminals and would-be
criminals who desire information and instructions on how to commit
crimes;" (3) Paladin "intended and had knowledge" that Hit Man
actually "would be used, upon receipt, by criminals and would-be
criminals to plan and execute the crime of murder for hire;" and (4)
Paladin's publication and sale of the book assisted Perry, in particular,
in the perpetration of the murders at issue in the case.' 8 Reversing
the district court's grant of summary judgment for Paladin, the Fourth
Circuit held that "long-established caselaw provides that speecheven speech by the press-that constitutes criminal aiding and

12.

Rice, 128 F.3d at 239.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.
16.

Id.
Id.

The book instructs beginners to solicit clients " 'through a personal acquaintance

whom you trust.'" Id.

(citing REX FERAL, HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT

CONTRACTORS 87). Perry found Lawrence Horn through a man who was both a "good friend" of
Perry's and Lawrence Horn's first cousin. Id. The solicitation of clients represents one of nearly
twenty examples where Perry's conduct precisely mimicked the books instructions, from
solicitation of clients to concealing the crime after committing the murders. Id. at 239-41. Hit
Man is

available online. See REX FERAL, HIT MAN ONLINE:

A TECHNICAL MANUAL

FOR

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS, at http://ftp.die.net/mirror/hitmanlindex.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2005).

17.

Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.

18.

Id.

248

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:241

abetting does not enjoy the protection of the First Amendment." 19 The
court explained that it was "convinced that such caselaw is both
correct and equally applicable to speech that constitutes civil aiding
''20
and abetting of criminal conduct.
21
In Boim, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants could
be civilly liable for aiding and abetting acts of terrorism if they
knowingly and intentionally funded such acts. 22 Although there is no
general presumption that a plaintiff may sue aiders and abettors
under a statutory right, the court held that Congress clearly intended
to create a private right of action for citizens injured by an act of
international terrorism. 23 Further, the court held that Congress
intended civil aiding and abetting liability because "Congress intended
to extend section 2333 liability beyond those persons directly
perpetrating acts of violence" and because the "statute itself defines
international terrorism so broadly-to include activities that 'involve'
violent acts." 24 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that civil
liability for funding a foreign terrorist organization does not offend the
25
First Amendment rights of freedom of association and advocacy.
Given these and other recent developments, the theory of civil
liability for aiding and abetting is claiming a position of new
importance in the law of torts. 26 This position of importance can be

19. Id. at 242.
20. Id. at 242-43.
21. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002).
22. Id. at 1028.
23. Id. at 1015.
24. Id. at 1020 (interpreting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2333).
25. Id. at 1027:
Given the stringent requirements that must be met before a group is designated a
foreign terrorist organization, Congress carefully limited its prohibition on funding as
narrowly as possible in order to achieve the government's interest in preventing
terrorism. We note that Congress did not attach liability for simply joining a terrorist
organization or zealously espousing its views. By prohibiting funding alone, Congress
employed means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational
freedoms.
26. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 742, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that continued
development of the civil aiding and abetting theory would improve the law of torts, making it
better able to provide redress to private victims of crime and tort); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 340, at 937 (2000) (footnotes omitted):
[T]he Restatement of Apportionment has recognized that the concert of action rule
may be appropriately expanded in the light of two contemporary developments in joint
and several liability and in comparative responsibility. In particular, if comparative
fault rules are applied to a landlord who negligently creates dangers that tenants will
be criminally attacked, the landlord may escape any significant liability on the ground
that his fault is miniscule in comparison to the rapist who attacks the tenant, at least
where joint and several liability is also abolished. Such a morally unacceptable result
is perhaps not inevitable, since some reasonable people may think a great deal of
responsibility should be assigned to the landlord, but it is a result that is all too likely.
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expected to expand rapidly given the natural tendency of injury
victims and their attorneys to attempt to enlarge the universe of
potentially responsible parties. Unfortunately, the theory of civil
aiding and abetting liability remains underdeveloped. There is no
clearly defined test for civil aiding and abetting liability because
courts apply different tests and often obfuscate their analyses. A
"sliding scale" analysis, also known as "in tandem" analysis, has
emerged as a potential solution for the difficult nature of the test for
civil aiding and abetting liability; however, the "sliding scale" analysis
and other judicial formulations actually frustrate the inquiry and
represent a mistaken and unwarranted departure from the traditional
formulations of aiding and abetting liability as articulated in both the
Restatement of Torts 27 and the criminal law. Indeed, the Second
Circuit has expressed great frustration over the ambiguity of the law
surrounding civil aiding and abetting claims:
After studying the many cases we might be inclined to wonder whether the elaborate
discussions have added anything except unnecessary detail to Judge L. Hand's famous
statement, made in a criminal context, that, in order to be held as an aider and abettor,
a person must "in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it
as something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it
succeed." 28

Despite expressing doubts about the fruitfulness of evolution of
the relevant law, the Court of Appeals then, with apparent reluctance,
proceeded to "discuss the question in the terms that have become
conventional. '29 This Note contends that the conventional terms are
disadvantageous and proposes a better alternative.
Given the confusion surrounding this theory of tort liability, as
well as the relative dearth of precedent, a comprehensive analysis is
necessary. This Note aims to provide that analysis by exploring the
theory of civil aiding and abetting liability in tort. This Note will
contend that neither the Restatement approach nor the judicial
formulations based thereon provide the most desirable analytical
framework. Instead, this Note will conclude that a mixture of the

With cases like this in mind, one draft of the Apportionment Restatement suggested
that the concert of action rules can be expanded so that the landlord and those
similarly situated would be subjected to full liability, jointly and severally with the
criminal, even in jurisdictions that have abolished joint and several liability generally.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979); accord RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 876(b) (1939).

28. IT, an Int'l Invest. Trust v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 922 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing
"United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938), cited and approved in Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)").
29. Cornfield, 619 F.2d at 922.
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various approaches provides an improved analytical
relative to the methodology currently used by the courts.

framework

III. COMPARISON OF CRIMINAL AND TORT LAW GENERALLY

Criminal law and tort law enjoy a close historical and
conceptual relationship. 30
As a result, a given actor's wrongful
conduct often renders him both civilly and criminally liable. 31 Several
crimes and torts bear the same name, such as assault, battery, and
libel. This Part aims to highlight both the similarities and the
distinctions between criminal and tort law. These similarities and
distinctions are relevant to understanding of civil aiding and abetting
liability.
The historical ties between the two bodies of law are
extensive. 32 In fact, the law of torts arose from criminal law during
the early development of English law.3 3 As the law continued to
evolve, judges and lawyers began to recognize that criminal and civil
law served related but distinct purposes, eventually leading to two
distinct bodies of law. 34 Since their inception, both areas of the law
have continued to influence greatly the evolution of one another. 35
Conceptually speaking, both criminal and tort law are
concerned with identifying and sanctioning wrongful conduct;

30.

JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 31 (2004).

31. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3, at 14 (4th ed. 2003). Professor Goldberg also
notes, "The same acts and events also give rise to criminal and tort suits." GOLDBERG ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 33 (discussing the recent example of former football star O.J. Simpson being
prosecuted and acquitted for the murder of ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her acquaintance
Ronald Goldman; however, Simpson was later found guilty of the death in a private tort suit by
the decedents' families and was held liable for millions in damages).
32. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 12.
33. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 2, at 4 ("Judges who imposed punishment upon lawbreakers at
one time also occasionally imposed civil liability.").
34. Id.
35. Courts presiding over civil cases often look to relevant criminal statutes to analyze the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. Id. § 134, at 315. This reliance exists because
criminal statutes are legislative expressions what best promotes public policy. See id. § 2, at 5.
The majority of courts apply statutory standards of conduct under the rule of negligence per se.
Id. § 134, at 315. The rule of negligence per se holds that violation of a statute is negligence in
itself, where the tort defendant's violation of the statute has caused the kind of harm the statute
sought to protect against and where the plaintiff was within the class of persons the statute was
intended to protect. See Wawanesa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Matlock, 60 Cal. App. 4th 583, 587, 590 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (reversing verdict against youth for fire damage resulting from illegal underage
smoking because the statute was intended to protect minors from early cigarette addiction and
not to prevent fires); accord DOBBS, supra note 27, § 134, at 315. For a complete exposition of the
elements of negligence per se, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). It is also
important to note that whether the criminal defendant's conduct is a tort is not important in the
determination of whether conduct violates the criminal law. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 2, at 4-5.
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however, the two bodies of law serve different functions and pursue
their differing functions through distinctive procedures and processes
to achieve each body of law's intended purpose. 36 The several
distinctions between criminal and tort law primarily stem from their
roles as public and private law, respectively. A possible laundry list of
differences includes distinct functions, initiators, moral emphases,
liabilities, and procedures.
First, the basic functions of the two bodies of law differ. The
function of criminal law is both to punish the criminal for his
misconduct and to protect the public against harm by punishing
conduct that causes or is likely to cause harm,3 7 as well as to deter
future actors from behaving in a like manner.3 8 The primary purpose
of tort law is to enable an injured party to seek redress for the harm
he or she has suffered at the hands of a wrongdoer. 39 William
Blackstone recognized the distinct functions of private and public law:
THE distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors from civil
injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private wrongs, or civil injuries, are an
infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered
merely as individuals; public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and
violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole community, considered as a
40
community, in it's [sic] social aggregate capacity.

Contemporary
distinction:

commentators

continue

to

recognize

the

same

A tort is a private wrong. A tort action is a civil proceeding seeking reparation for the
party wronged in person or property. A crime, on the other hand, is an offense against
society, or the state, and the state is responsible for the institution of proceedings
against the accused. A criminal action involves a public wrong, and its purpose is to
satisfy public justice. While only an individual might be affected by a public wrong, yet,

36. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 30, at 31; LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 15-16
(describing the functions and procedures for each body of law).
37. E.g., State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Cobb, 2 S.E.2d 565, 567 (N.C. 1939) ('The
distinction between a tort and a crime with respect to the character of the rights affected and the
nature of the wrong is this: A tort is simply a private wrong in that it is an infringement of the
civil rights of individuals, considered merely as individuals, while a crime is a public wrong in
that it affects public rights and is an injury to the whole community, considered as a community,
in its social aggregate capacity."); LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 15-16 (describing the
functions and procedures for each body of law).
38. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 30, at 32. Commentators also emphasize that a critical
difference between tort and criminal law is the different manner in which actual harm is treated.
E.g., DOBBS, supra note 26, § 2, at 5 ("Criminal law redresses the state's interests in the security
of society. It may punish conduct that threatens those interests even when no harm has been
done. Speeding increases risks to others and so may be punished criminally. Tort law, aimed at
protection of individuals, would never impose liability for speeding alone; tort law would impose
liabilityonly if harm results.") (emphasis added).
39. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 13.
40.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 5 (Univ. of Chicago

Press 2002) (1769).
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because of their evil effects on society as a whole, either the common
law or a statute
41
has made those who commit such wrongs subject to prosecution.

In short, the primary goal of tort law is to provide redress to a victim,
most commonly in the form of monetary damages, whereas the
primary goal of the criminal law is to protect and vindicate society's
42
interests.
Second, different parties initiate the legal process under each
of the two bodies of law: the state in criminal law, and an injured
plaintiff in tort law. 43 This distinction also existed several centuries
ago, when Blackstone wrote that English criminal law was deemed
the doctrine of the pleas of the crown:
so called, because the king, in whom centers the majesty of the whole community, is
supposed by the law to be the person injured by every infraction of the public right
belonging to that community,
and is therefore, in all cases, the proper prosecutor for
44
every public offense.
45

Modern law continues to recognize this distinction.
Third, the two bodies of law have different levels of emphasis
on morality, i.e., a bad mind. 46 Moral concerns underlie much of the
criminal law, which seeks to deter and punish certain conduct where
an "evil mind" accompanies the conduct. Tort law, on the other hand,
focuses primarily upon redressing a plaintiffs injury by achieving the

41. J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 2.2 (2d ed.
2003).
42. Id. Debate exists, however, regarding the proper purpose for criminal law, beyond the
simple deter and punish philosophy. For an expanded discussion on the purposes of criminal
law, see generally LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.5 (discussing theories of punishment, such as
prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, deterrence, education, and retribution). The functions of
tort law can be grouped into at least five broad categories: compensation-deterrence theory,
enterprise liability theory, economic deterrence theory, social justice theory, and individual
justice theory. For an expanded discussion on the various theories of the functions of tort law,
see generally, John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003).
43. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 15-16 ("With crimes the state itself brings criminal
proceedings to protect the public interest but not to compensate the victim; with torts, the
injured party himself institutes proceedings to recover damages (or perhaps to enjoin the
defendant from causing further damage")) (footnotes omitted). Professor Goldberg illustrates
this point by noting that in a criminal proceeding, the court documents would read State v.
Defendant because the action would have been "commenced not by the victim, but by a
government official, such as a district attorney, who represents all citizens of the jurisdiction."
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 30, at 32.
44. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 2 (emphasis added).
45. CHARLES R. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 7, at 27 (15th ed. 1993) ("In the case of
a tort, the injured individual need not bring a civil action against the wrongdoer; in the case of a
crime, the victim cannot prevent a criminal prosecution from being launched against the
offender.").
46. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 15.
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desired social result between the parties to the litigation, with a lesser
47
emphasis on morality.
At English common law, crimes generally arose from notions of
natural law, at least for crimes considered malum in se. 48 Generally
speaking, a particular act (actus reus) without a bad mind (mens rea)
cannot be the basis for criminal liability. 49 Tort law, however, readily
imposes liability without a bad mind, e.g., when a defendant's conduct
fails to meet the reasonable standard of care. 50 Thus, even where tort
uses terms such as "malice" or "intent," the actual wickedness such
terms describe is not an element in the civil wrongs to which those
terms are applied. 51 As tort law focuses upon redressing the plaintiffs
injury, it inherently follows that the plaintiff must have suffered a
legally cognizable injury.5 2 Criminal law, by contrast, emphasizes

47. See id. § 1.3, at 16 ('With torts the emphasis is more on a fair adjustment of the
conflicting interests of the litigating parties to achieve a desirable social result, with morality
taking on less importance.") (quotation marks and footnote omitted); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra
note 30, at 33 (stating that criminal law may be described as "primarily public, rather than a law
of private redress"). For an expanded discussion on the functions of criminal and tort law, see
supra note 42.
48. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 7:
It is clear, that the right of punishing crimes against the law of nature, as murder and
the like, is in a state of mere nature vested in every individual.... Whatever power
therefore individuals had of punishing offenses against the law of nature, that is now
vested in the magistrate alone; who bears the sword of justice by the consent of the
whole community.
Blackstone proceeds to state, "AS to offenses merely against the laws of society, which are only
mala prohibita, and not mala in se; the temporal magistrate is also empowered to inflict coercive
penalties for such transgressions: and this by the consent of individuals .... " Id. at 8.
49. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 1.2, at 8. But, LaFave points out that "[o]f all the basic
premises, this is doubtless the one least adhered to in modern criminal law, which has often
created strict criminal liability based upon actus or omissions alone, and vicarious liability based
upon another's acts or omissions." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2, at 14 (3rd ed. 2000)
n. 9.
50. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 2, at 5 ("Some kind of intent is also required for some torts, but
more commonly mere negligence coupled with actual harm will suffice for liability."). Of course,
the standard of reasonable care is not without its critics. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 111-12 (39th ed. 1946):
[I]t is . . . clear that the featureless generality that the defendant was bound to use
such care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be
continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to use this or that
precaution under these or those circumstances.
51. HOLMES, supra note 50, at 130.
52. See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1625, 1636-41 (2002) ('There is a fundamental distinction between criminal law, on the one
hand, and tort law, on the other. Criminal law sometimes prohibits and punishes genuinely
inchoate wrongs - uncompleted wrongful acts. Tort law does not."); accord DOBBS, supra note 26,
§ 2, at 5.
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deterrence and morality and thus does not require an actual injury, as
53
evidenced by criminal sanction for inchoate crimes.
Fourth, a particular defendant's potential liability provides
another
obvious
distinction:
criminal
law largely
utilizes
imprisonment, whereas tort law generally involves monetary
damages. Thus, while the defendant found liable in tort commonly
pays monetary damages to compensate the victim, Justice Holmes
once pointed out that "[t]he prisoner pays with his body." 54 The
severity of criminal punishment constitutes the primary reason for the
disparity between the criminal and civil burdens of proof, which are,
respectively, beyond a reasonable doubt and by a preponderance of the
evidence. 55 The severity of criminal punishment also provides a basis
for the modern usage of statutes to define conduct as criminal, as
statutes provide superior notice and certainty relative to a mass
56
collection of common law precedent.
IV. BASIC ELEMENTS OF AIDING AND ABETTING IN TORT LAW

A. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(b)
The elements of civil aiding and abetting are at the center of
the confusion surrounding the tort. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts Section§ 876 provides: "For harm resulting to a third person
from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he...
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself."57 General confusion has surrounded the question of
53. See supra note 52; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 776 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
"inchoate" as "[plartially completed or imperfectly formed; just begun"). Black's provides the
following examples of inchoate, or preliminary, crimes: attempt, conspiracy, and incitement. Id.
at 777.
54. HOLMES, supra note 50, at 41; see also TORCIA, supra note 45, § 7, at 26 ("As a result of
the criminal prosecution, the offender may be imprisoned; as a result of the civil action, the
injured individual may recover money damages.").
55. Cf. TORCIA, supra note 45, § 7, at 26 ("In a criminal proceeding, the defendant's guilt
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt; in a civil action, the defendant's liability may be
established merely by a preponderance of the evidence.").
56. Cf. id. § 9, at 32-35:
As the need for systematizing the existing body of law and for creating new offenses
came to be recognized, state legislatures enacted comprehensive penal codes....
Although, in the remaining codes, there is silence on the matter, the mere enactment
of a comprehensive penal code impliedly suggests an intended abrogation of commonlaw crimes.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
For example, suppose A and B
participate in a riot in which B, although throwing no rocks himself, encourages A to throw
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what exact test courts should use to determine liability. Obviously,
Section 876 requires a wrongful act by the principal for liability to
attach at all. 58 Thus, the confusion primarily surrounds the proper
interpretation of subsection (b).
Before analyzing the proper interpretation and application of
Section 876(b), a thorough examination of the comment to subsection
(b) provides useful background and guidance.
The comment
establishes that aiding and abetting a breach of duty "has the same
effect upon the liability of the advisor as participation or physical
assistance . . . the one [who aids and abets] . . . is himself a tortfeasor
and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act."5 9 The
comment to Section 876(b) also explains that liability for aiding and
abetting does not require physical assistance or participation but that
advice or encouragement-standing alone-may also suffice. 60
Encouragement or advice to act provides moral support to the primary
tortfeasor; 61 consequently, the Restatement believes that such moral
support, just like physical assistance or participation, constitutes a
basis for imposing liability on the encourager if he knows that the act
encouraged is wrongful. 62 The determination of aiding and abetting
defendant's liability does not depend upon the principal tortfeasor's
63
knowledge of the tortious nature of his act.
The ultimate determination of liability also turns upon
whether the assistance or encouragement was a "substantial factor" in
causing the wrongful act. 64 The comment to subsection (b) provides a
list of five factors to be considered when analyzing whether the
defendant's participation was a substantial factor in the resulting
wrongful act: (1) "the nature of the act encouraged," (2) "the amount of
assistance given by the defendant," (3) "his presence or absence at the
rocks. Suppose further that one of the rocks strikes C, a bystander. B is then subject to civil
liability to C for aiding and abetting. Id. cmt. d, illus. 4.
58. The text of Restatement Section 876 provides a general rule that the defendant is liable
under Section 876 only if a third party's tortious conduct resulted in harm to the plaintiff. Id.
Thus, the Restatement requires the following foundational requirements for liability under
Section 876: the third party's conduct (1) was in fact tortious and (2) did result in harm to the
plaintiff. Id.
59. Id. § 876(b) cmt. d. Thus, a defendant liable under Section 876(b) is jointly and
severally liable with the primary tortfeasor for the plaintiffs injuries. See, e.g., Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 625 (Kan. 1968) ("One who aids, abets and encourages others in
the commission of an unlawful act is guilty as a principal, and all are jointly and severally liable
in a civil action for any damages that may have resulted from their act.").
60. Id. § 876 cmt. b.
61. Id. § 876.
62. Id. § 876 cmt b.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 876 cmt. d.
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time of the tort," (4) "his relation to the other," and (5) "his state of
65
mind."
Finally, the comment to subsection (b) provides guidance
regarding the scope of a defendant's liability under Section 876(b) for
other acts committed by the primary wrongdoer. "Other acts" refers to
legal wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer that were not
specifically encouraged or assisted by the aiding and abetting
defendant. 66 The Restatement bases the scope of such a defendant's
liability essentially upon a proximate cause analysis that hinges on
whether the other acts were reasonably foreseeable by the
defendant. 67 In short, the defendant's Section 876(b) liability extends
to the particular wrong that he encouraged, as well as to other wrongs
that were reasonably foreseeable results of the encouraged wrong.
In sum, the Restatement provides the following basic
requirements for civil aiding and abetting liability: (1) that a tortious
act be committed by the primary tortfeasor; (2) that the defendant
know that the primary tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of
some duty; (3) that the defendant provide substantial assistance or
encouragement to the breach of that duty; and (4) that the defendant's
assistance or encouragement constitute a proximate cause of the
68
resulting tort or torts.
B. Aiding and Abetting Distinguishedfrom Other Forms of Concerted
Action Liability
In order to understand fully civil aiding and abetting liability,
one must recognize and appreciate the distinctions between civil
aiding and abetting liability and the various other forms of civil
liability that exist for concerted tortious action. Judge Wald of the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that the text of
Restatement Section 876 lends little guidance to distinguishing the
theories contained therein. 69 In fact, the subtle distinctions between

65. Id. § 876 cmt. b. These factors have been widely used by the courts as guidance to the
substantiality inquiry. E.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
(explaining that the Restatement summarizes these elements in comment b.)
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt, d (1979).
67. See id. ("In determining liability, the factors are the same as those used in determining
the existence of legal causation when there has been negligence (see § 442) or recklessness. (See
§ 501).") (emphasis added); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484 ("[A] person who assists a tortious act
may be liable for other reasonably foreseeable acts done in connection with it.").
68.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).

69. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 476 ('Various theories of civil liability are untidily grouped
under the general heading of concerted tortious action."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
876.
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the various theories confuse the courts on occasion. 70 Even though a
particular set of facts may render a defendant liable under more than
one theory, the distinctions are important because cases arise where
the defendant only would be liable, if at all, under just one of the
various theories of concerted action liability. 7 1 Other prominent bases
of concerted action liability include conspiracy, joint enterprise, and
72
Section 876(c).
1. Conspiracy
Civil conspiracy is commonly confused with civil aiding and
abetting, but there are several key distinctions between the two
theories. Civil conspiracy includes the following factors:
(1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful act, or a
lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act
performed by one of the parties to the agreement;
(4) which overt act was done pursuant
73
to and in furtherance of the common scheme.

Courts and commentators frequently blur the distinction
between conspiracy and aiding and abetting. 74 The requirement of
agreement in the civil conspiracy analysis represents the crucial
distinction from civil aiding and abetting, which requires no
agreement to constitute the tort. 75 Courts sometimes rely on evidence
of assistance to infer an agreement, which is then labeled a "civil
76
conspiracy."
The focus on substantial assistance in civil aiding and abetting
is another distinction between the two theories because, for conspiracy
liability, a defendant need only provide the assistance inherent within

70. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478 ("Courts and commentators have frequently blurred
the distinction between the two theories of concerted liability.").
71.

Id.

72. I refer to the third member of this list as "Section 876(c)," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876(c) (1979), to avoid unnecessary confusion because liability under this subsection
has been generally dubbed "concerted action" liability, which is the term that I use to refer to all
of the various forms of liability for persons who act in concert.
73. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979)
("For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to
liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him .... "); id. § 876 cmt. b (stating that the term "conspiracy" is often used to refer to
common design or plan").
74. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478.
75. Id. at 478. The criminal law, of course, shares the distinction as well. Compare MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1962) (criminal liability for complicity or conduct of another), with
id. § 5.03(1) (criminal conspiracy).
76. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477. Judge Wald noted that such an inferred agreement has
not always been justified given the underlying facts of the particular case. Id.
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the agreement itself.77 To illustrate, if one presumes all the elements
of civil conspiracy listed above are satisfied, a defendant may be found
guilty of civil conspiracy without proof of "substantial assistance"
because making the agreement is all the defendant must do to assist
the primary wrongdoer's action. The requirement of a mere agreement
allows for much greater temporal or physical distance between the
conspirator and the underlying wrong than would be permitted if
substantial assistance were required. 78 As a result, civil liability may
attach to a conspirator for a more attenuated relationship with the
underlying wrongdoing than for an aider and abettor. Furthermore, in
most cases, multiple defendants cannot, as a matter of law, be held
liable for civil conspiracy for their negligence; 79 however, a defendant
certainly may substantially assist or encourage the negligence of
another so as to allow liability for civil aiding and abetting of another's
77. Id. (emphasis in original):
There is a qualitative difference between proving an agreement to participate in a
tortious line of conduct, and proving knowing action that substantially aids tortious
conduct. In some situations, the trier of fact cannot reasonably infer an agreement
from substantial assistance or encouragement. A court must then ensure that all the
elements of the separate basis of aiding-abetting have been satisfied.").
78. Id. at 485.
79. Courts have stated that "it is difficult to conceive of how a conspiracy could establish
vicarious liability where the primary wrong is negligence." Id. at 478. Other courts have held
that allegations of mere negligence by multiple defendants do not state a cause of action for civil
conspiracy as a matter of law. See, e.g., Juhl v. Arrington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted):
"[Clivil conspiracy requires specific intent" to agree "to accomplish an unlawful
purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means." Because negligence by
definition is not an intentional wrong, one cannot agree or conspire to be negligent.
Therefore [under] § 876(a) we would require allegations of specific intent, or perhaps
at least gross negligence, to state a cause of action. Because [the plaintiffs] pleadings
allege only that defendants were negligent, civil conspiracy and § 876(a) are not
theories upon which he could have relied to support summary judgment.
See also, e.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd. 114 F. Supp. 2d 797, 837 (N. D. Iowa 2000) (holding
that under Iowa law "because conspiracy requires an agreement to commit a wrong, there can
hardly be a conspiracy to be negligent-that is, to intend to act negligently"); accord Allstate
Indem. Co. v. Lewis, 985 F. Supp. 1341 (M. D. Ala. 1997). The reasoning behind this rule is that
the specific intent required to form a conspiracy would reasonably prescribe a conclusion that
"[1logic dictates that parties cannot conspire or agree to commit negligence." In re Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether ('MTBE") Prod. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citations omitted). But see J.T.T. v. Chon Tri, 111 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003)
(emphasis added) (internal citation omitted):
It is because the requirement of specific intent to inflict injury is absent from
negligence that parties cannot engage in a conspiracy to be negligent. But this rule of
law does not entail that parties cannot conspire to cause injury by their negligence, for,
in such a case, the gist of the conspiracy is not negligence, but the injury the
conspiratorsspecifically intend to cause.
Given J. T. T., a plaintiff could perhaps state a claim of civil conspiracy if the facts show that two
or more defendants explicitly or implicitly agreed to make a shoddy product so that they could
get rich.
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negligence.8 0 Finally, the theory of liability affects who is liable for
what, i.e., who may be rendered vicariously liable for another's
wrongs. 8 ' While an aider and abettor is liable for the wrongs of the
primary wrongdoer, the primary wrongdoer would not be liable for
wrongs committed by the aider and abettor, absent a finding of
conspiracy.8 2 In sum, while the civil theories of conspiracy and aiding
and abetting often overlap, several notable distinctions warrant
83
diligence by the courts to respect the autonomy of the two theories.
2. Joint Enterprise
In addition to civil aiding and abetting and civil conspiracy,
another important theory of vicarious tort liability is the joint
enterprise doctrine. Joint enterprise represents a form of liability
akin to a partnership or joint venture.8 4 To find that a joint enterprise
exists, courts generally require a showing of both (1) a common object
and purpose of the undertaking, and (2) an equal right to direct and
govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect to the
common object and purpose of the undertaking.8 5 Both requirements
must be satisfied for a joint enterprise to exist.8 6 If a joint enterprise
exists, then each member constitutes an agent for the others, leading
87
to vicarious liability.
The distinctions between joint enterprise liability and aiding
and abetting liability are numerous. First, aiding and abetting
requires substantial assistance by the defendant, whereas joint
enterprise merely requires an agency-like relationship.8 8 Second, joint
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. (1979); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478.
81. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478.
82. Id.
83. See id. ("[W]e find it important to keep the distinctions clearly in mind as we review the
facts in this novel case to see if tort liability is warranted on either or both concerted action
theories. For the distinctions can make a difference.") (emphasis added).
84. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 340, at 933.
85. E.g., Yant v. Woods, 120 S.W.3d 574, 576 (Ark. 2003); see also DOBBS, supra note 26, §
340, at 933 ('The joint enterprise is found to exist when two or more persons tacitly or expressly
undertake an activity together-usually an automobile trip-with common purpose, community
of interest and an equal right to a voice in the control.").
86. Yant, 120 S.W.3d at 576.
87. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 340, at 933.
88. Professor Dobbs provides the following illustration: "If the enterprise is an automobile
trip, the passenger, who ordinarily has no responsibility for the safe operation of the vehicle, may
thus be liable to an injured third person if the driver negligently causes harm." DOBBS, supra
note 26, § 340, at 933. Thus, independent contractors sharing a car on their way home from
work out of town may be held liable for the negligence of the one who is driving, regardless of
whether the passengers substantially assisted the driver's negligence. Cf. Yant, 120 S.W.3d at
576 (holding that plaintiff, a passenger asleep in backseat of vehicle who was injured by the
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enterprise has no knowledge requirement to hold the secondary actor
liable for the primary wrongdoer's conduct, whereas aiding and
abetting requires at a minimum that the defendant "knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty."8 9 Third, joint enterprise
requires the participants to have an equal right to control one another
in the course of the enterprise, and while such an ability of control
may arguably be the case in a given aiding and abetting situation, it is
not a predicate to aiding and abetting liability. 90 Fourth, and perhaps
most importantly, civil liability for aiding and abetting seems to be in
doctrine has
a trend of expansion, 9 1 whereas "[t]he joint-enterprise
92
anachronism."
an
as
late
of
been criticized
3. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(c)
One more form of vicarious tort liability deserves mention:
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876 provides: "For harm
resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he . . . (c) gives substantial assistance to the other
in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." The
classic example of a scenario meeting these criteria is the famous case
Summers v. Tice, 93 in which the evidence showed that two defendants
driver's negligent overturn of the vehicle, unable to recover against the driver as a matter of law
because the two were held to be engaged in a joint enterprise).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). Potential heightened knowledge
requirements for civil aiding and abetting liability are discussed subsequently. See infra Part
V.B.
90. See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (1968) (holding all four
young boys who broke into church for sodas liable when only two of the boys negligently burned
the church down).
91. See generally Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that
certain funding can constitute aid and abetting of terrorisim); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying a motion for summary judgment as to whether U.S. oil companies
aided and abetted the Mynamar government in persecuting its citizens), opinion vacated and
rehearingen banc granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the First Amendment does not bar civil liability for aiding and
abetting criminal conduct).
92. Yant, 120 S.W.3d at 580 (Brown and Imber, JJ., dissenting). Justice Brown quoted
Prosser's statement that "[t]he courts should be expected to continue to narrow the scope of the
doctrine to ameliorate its rigors." Id. Yant illustrates the joint enterprise doctrine as an
absolute shield to liability between members of the enterprise, akin to contributory negligence,
as opposed to the joint enterprise doctrine as a form of vicarious liability. Id. at 576 (majority
opinion) ("The effect of the doctrine's application is that the driver's negligence or misconduct is
imputed to the passenger to bar the passenger's recovery."). The elements of the doctrine are the
same in either context. For a case using the joint enterprise doctrine as a form of vicarious
liability, see Reed v. McGibboney, 422 S.W.2d 115 (Ark. 1967).
93. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). While Summers arguably meets the criteria
for Section 876(c) liability, Summers likely did not turn upon substantial assistance, as the case
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"at the same time or one immediately after the other, shot at a quail
and in so doing shot toward the plaintiff who was uphill from them,
and that the they knew his location." 94 The plaintiff was unable to
prove whose shot had actually injured him.95 Since the conduct of each
defendant was negligent with regard to the plaintiff, the court held
both defendants jointly and severally liable, despite the fact that one
96
of them did not even injure the plaintiff.
Given that both defendants breached a duty to the plaintiff by
knowingly firing in his direction, one reasonably could contend that
the facts of Summers v. Tice would establish liability under Section
876(c), provided that the defendants by their conduct were found to
have substantially encouraged each other to shoot negligently. 97 By
contrast, civil liability for aiding and abetting would not require the

seems to pertain more particularly to burden shifting from the plaintiff to the defendants in
cases in which (1) there are multiple sufficient causes and (2) the actual source of the injury, i.e.,
which defendant actually caused the injury, is unknown. See infra note 96. The court in
Summers did refer to Section 876(b) and (c); however, both the purpose of this reference by the
court and the impact of Section 876 on the outcome of the case are highly ambiguous. 199 P.2d
1.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id. at 2-5.
96. Id. at 4 ("[P]laintiff has made out a case when he has produced evidence that gives rise
to an inference of negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury."). The court further
noted:
If defendants are independent tort feasors and thus each liable for the damages
caused by him alone, and, at least, where the matter of apportionment is incapable of
proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress. The
wrongdoers should be left to work out between themselves any apportionment.
Id. at 5.
97. Suppose, for example, that Hunter X and Hunter Y both take aim to fire a negligent
shot toward the plaintiff. Suppose further that both Hunter X and Hunter Y notice the other
taking aim when they respectively take aim themselves. Suppose that both hunters fire, and the
plaintiff is injured. However, unlike Summers, it is known that Hunter X's shot injured the
plaintiff and that Hunter Y's shot killed quail and in no way physically harmed the plaintiff.
Under Section 876(c), could Hunter X be held to have been substantially assisted in taking the
negligent shot by seeing Hunter Y likewise take aim? While the common parlance of
"substantially" likely would lead most to conclude that this would not be substantial assistance
or encouragement, Illustration 6 provides that this degree of assistance or encouragement would
be a sufficient basis for liability under Section 876(b). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876
illus. 6 (1979).
Since liability under Section 876(b) requires "substantial assistance or
encouragement," one may reasonably infer that Hunter Y's actions may likewise be sufficient to
establish "substantial assistance" to Hunter X's decision to take the injurious shot. Id. § 876. On
the other hand, one might reasonably contend that the absence of the word "encouragement" in
Section 876(c) marks the distinctive factor that would preclude liability under Section 876(c),
based upon the contention that Hunter Ys actions may have been "encouragement" so as to
allow liability under Section 876(b) but not "assistance" as required for liability under Section
876(c). Id. § 876(c).

262

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:241

defendant's conduct to constitute a breach a duty to the plaintiff,98 as
an alleged aider and abettor could be held liable for merely
encouraging the primary actor to breach the primary actor's duty to
the plaintiff, irrespective of the alleged aider and abettor's possession
or breach of a duty to the plaintiff.99 Consequently, a defendant may
be liable for civil aiding and abetting, even if the defendant did not
breach a duty that he owed to the plaintiff or even if the defendant
owed no duty at all to the plaintiff. Another distinction between
Section 876(c) and civil aiding and abetting is that subsection (c) does
not require any knowledge on the part of the accomplice, 10 0 whereas
aiding and abetting liability explicitly requires that the defendant
knows the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty. 10 '
C. Common Law Modifications: The "JudicialTest"
Restatement Section 876(b) and the accompanying official
comments merely provide a basic foundation for understanding civil
aiding and abetting liability. The relevant case law provides further
insight into how the test for liability has developed. As mentioned
10 2
previously, a relative dearth of precedent exists on the subject,
making the inquiry difficult and rendering the application of general
legal principles important to a proper understanding of the matter.103

98. See, e.g., Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. United Am. Bank of Memphis 21 F. Supp. 2d 785,
795-96 (W. D. Tenn. 1998) (holding that "[clontrary to [defendant's] arguments, Tennessee law
does not impose liability for aiding and abetting based on a duty between the defendant and
plaintiff. Rather, the cause of action is much broader, imposing liability if 'the defendant knew
that his companions' conduct constituted a breach of duty.' That is, under § 876(b), the defendant
need not owe a duty to the plaintiff, but rather, must know that a third party owes a duty to the
plaintiff.") (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
99. E.g., Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822, 822 (N.M. 1979) (holding an uncle liable for the
battery of the plaintiff, although the uncle did not actually assault or batter the plaintiff but
merely encouraged his nephew to do so by shouting "Kill him!" and "Hit him more!" as his
nephew battered the plaintiff).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. e (1979) ("Thus each of a number of
trespassers who are jointly excavating a short ditch is liable for the entire harm done by the
ditch, although each reasonably believes that he is not trespassing").
101. Id. § 876(b).
102. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
103. See generally supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text (comparing criminal and tort
law).
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1. Securities Law Origins/Influence
Federal securities law cases compose the largest body of
precedent in the civil aiding and abetting context. 10 4 This simple fact
presents several problems. First, courts and commentators alike have
been reluctant to impose civil aiding and abetting liability on
businesses engaging in routine transactions, which has impacted the
application of Restatement Section 876(b). 10 5 This reluctance has been
apparent especially in the securities law context because that law
often imposes strict or quasistrict liability.10 6 Such liability can be
substantial, with damages often in the tens or even the hundreds of
millions, representing a stark contrast to the damages available to a
plaintiff bringing a claim for, say, a garden variety battery.
Second, the United States Supreme Court greatly surprised
most observers with its decision in Central Bank, in which the Court
rejected the substantial body of securities law precedent involving civil
aiding and abetting liability and held that the relevant securities
statutes do not provide a cause of action for civil aiding and
abetting.107 Third, securities cases involve federal law; consequently,
the vast body of aiding and abetting precedent from federal securities

104. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Precedent, except in the
securities area, is largely confined to isolated acts of adolescents in rural society.").
105. E.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1975):
[W]e find that a person may be held as an aider and abettor only if some other party
has committed securities law violation, if the accused party had general awareness
that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper, and if the accused aiderabettor knowingly and substantially assisted the violation.
106. For example, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes strict liability on an issuer
for certain misstatements or omissions in the registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (1933).
In the formulation of relief, however, concepts of fairness to those who are expected to
govern their conduct under Rule 10b-5 should be considered. Protection for investors
is of primary importance, but it must be kept in mind that the nation's welfare
depends upon the maintenance of a viable, vigorous business community. Considered
alone, the sweeping language of Rule 10b-5 creates an almost completely undefined
liability. All that the rule requires for its violation is that someone "do something
bad," JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 961 (2d ed. 1968), in connection
with a purchase or sale of securities. Without further delineation, civil liability is
formless, and the area of proscribed activity could become so great that the beneficial
aspects of the rule would not warrant the proscription. David S. Ruder, Pitfalls in the
Development of a Federal Law of Corporationsby Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59
Nw. U. L. REV. 185, 207-208 (1964). In recognition of this problem, courts have sought
to construct workable limits to liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which will
accommodate the interests of investors, the business community, and the public
generally.
Woodward, 522 F.2d at 91. "Thus, despite our firm support of Rule 10b-5's creative use in
thwarting fraudulent schemes related to securities transactions, we recognize that we must also
draw some limits on the scope of the Rule." Id.
107. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994).
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law case, not only fails to bind any state courts, but also fails to apply
any state tort law.
Therefore, applying securities law precedents to other forms of
civil aiding and abetting claims presents obvious hazards given the
special nature of securities fraud actions, the subsequent rejection of
aiding and abetting liability with regard to private 10b-5 claims by the
Supreme Court, and the questionable applicability of legal principles
developed under the federal securities laws to common law tort claims
in state courts. Notwithstanding the aforementioned dangers, courts
routinely employ securities fraud cases as precedent for civil aiding
and abetting cases in contexts other than the securities area, without
reference to the previously enumerated doubts as to its
108
applicability.
2. The "Judicial Test"
Influenced by pre-Central Bank securities law, courts have
developed the following general test, hereinafter the "judicial test," for
civil aiding and abetting liability:
(1) the primary actor must commit a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the aider
and abettor must be generally aware of his role in the overall wrongful activity at the
time assistance is provided; . .. (3) the aider and abettor must knowingly and
substantially assist the wrongful act ... [and 1(4)]
the alleged substantial assistance
09
must be the proximate cause of plaintiffs' harm.

The judicial test resembles Restatement Section 876(b) in
many ways. The judicial test retains the basic requirement that the
primary actor commit an underlying wrongful act that injured the
plaintiff. 110 The judicial test also retains the requirement that the
defendant's assistance must be a legal cause of the plaintiffs injury.1 1'
Finally, the judicial test continues to hold the accomplice and the
primary wrongdoer jointly and severally liable. 112
However, the judicial test above differs from the Restatement
formulation in three ways. Each of the three changes refashions the
inquiry into the requisite knowledge of the defendant, with the first

108. E.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (applying securities law
principles to an action for aiding and abetting criminal conduct causing wrongful death of the
plaintiffs decedent).
109. In re Temporomandibular Joint ("TMJ") Implants Prod. Liab., 113 F.3d 1484, 1495 (8th
Cir. 1997).
110. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 476-77 (noting that liability for concerted tortious
action, such as aiding and abetting, provides that all persons who acted in concert to commit a
tort are held liable for the entire result); see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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two changes being the most significant. As one considers all three
changes at length, what becomes evident is that the precise nature of
the knowledge inquiry is far from clear. The inquiry perhaps has been
rendered more ambiguous as a result of the following judicial
modifications, especially after consideration of the judicial glosses on
these modifications.
First, the judicial test departs from the Restatement's verbal
formulation of the knowledge requirement in the second prong of the
test for liability. Rather than requiring that the accomplice "knows
that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty,"113 the judicial
test requires that the accomplice be "generallyaware of his role in the
overall illegal activity."'114 This change adopts a more exacting
standard: the defendant must be aware not only of another's wrong,
but also of the way in which his conduct is contributing to the
wrong. 1 15 In Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, the Fifth Circuit
explained that "[o]ne could know of the existence of a 'wrong' without
being aware of his role in the scheme, and it is the participation that
is at issue." 1 6 Courts originally elevated this knowledge requirement
17
to prevent "over-inclusiveness" of liability in the securities area;"
however, this verbal change has permeated the law of civil aiding and
118
abetting in all areas.
Second, the judicial test also augments the requirements set
forth in the Restatement by adding a knowledge requirement. 119 In
place of the requirement that the defendant "given substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other to so conduct himself,"' 20 the
judicial test requires that the defendant "must knowingly and
substantially assist the wrongful act."'12 As with the first modification

113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (emphasis added).
114. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (factors of the judicial test) (emphasis
added).
115. "Role" in ordinary parlance means a "function or part performed especially in a
particular operation or process." MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at http://www.mw.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=dictionary&va=role (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
116. 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. Id. at 95. Perhaps this phenomenon in securities cases finds explanation in the adage
that "bad facts make bad law," as courts sought to avoid a scope of liability that would
encompass routine business transactions and thereby threaten the vitality of commerce.
118. E.g., In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litigation, 113 F.3d
1484 (8th Cir. 1997) (products liability); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(wrongful death).
119. Compare judicial test, supra note 109 and accompanying text, with the approach of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b), supra note 68 and accompanying text.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).

121. Id. (emphasis added); see supra note 109 and accompanying text (factors of the judicial
test).
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discussed above, this judicial innovation arose from the desire to
122
prevent overinclusive liability in the federal securities law context.
The Fifth Circuit explained in Woodward that "[a] remote party must
not only be aware of his role, but he should also know when and to
what degree he is furthering the fraud." 123 As above, this second
constraint on liability over and above the Restatement's formulation
has spread from securities cases to the law of civil aiding and abetting
124
generally.
Third, Halberstam v. Welch, the most influential case to employ
the judicial test, added a sixth factor, "duration of the assistance
provided," to the original five factors provided in the comment to
Restatement Section 876(b). 125 The court explained that the longevity
of the encouragement or assistance to the primary wrongdoer "almost
certainly affects the quality and extent of their relationship and
126
probably influences the amount of aid provided as well."'
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the duration of assistance could
serve as evidence of the defendant's state of mind. 27 Therefore, the
additional factor also encompasses an explicit alteration of the
Restatement's version of what constitutes substantial assistance by
further emphasizing the importance of the defendant's state of
8
mind.12

122. See Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95 ("The first two Landy elements pose a danger of overinclusiveness and seem to lose sight of the necessary connection to the securities laws. One could
know of the existence of a 'wrong' without being aware of his role in the scheme, and it is the
participation that is at issue. The scienter requirement scales upward when activity is more
remote; therefore, the assistance rendered should be both substantial and knowing.").
123. Id.
124. E.g., In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litigation, 113 F.3d
1484 (8th Cir. 1997) (products liability); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(wrongful death); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305 (Colo. App. 1994) (attorney breach of fiduciary
duty); Patton v. Simone, 626 A.2d 844 (Del. Super. 1992) (personal injury).
125. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d.
(1979) (listing five factors to consider when determining whether or not defendant's assistance
was substantial).
126. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484.
127. Id. (emphasis added) ("[A]dditionally, it may afford evidence of the defendant's state of
mind.").
128. I say "further emphasizing" because the original list of five factors from the
Restatement includes the defendant's "state of mind." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876
cmt. d. (1979). Thus, Halberstam'ssixth factor provides an additional degree of focus upon the
defendant's state of mind, relative to the Restatement, especially given the Halberstam court's
explanation of why this factor was necessary. See supra notes 125-128 and accompanying text;
see also Josephine Willis, Note, To (B) or Not to (B): The Future of Aider and Abettor Liability in
South Carolina, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2000) ("It probably makes little difference whether
the duration of assistance is treated as a separate factor or is viewed as a subset of the factors
examining the defendant's state of mind and relation to the wrongdoer.").
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In sum, the judicial test changed the focus of the second prong
from defendant's knowledge of a breach of duty to knowledge of his
own role in the breach of duty; changed the third prong to require that
the defendant knowingly provides assistance; and changed the test for
determining the substantiality of defendant's assistance to turn
slightly more on the defendant's state of mind. With respect to the
first and second changes, the judicial test requires that the defendant
know of his role and know of his assistance, which seem to be the
same thing. If a defendant knows of his role in a wrongdoer's ongoing
illegal scheme, then how could one not reasonably conclude that the
defendant knows he is assisting the scheme? In ordinary parlance, a
"role" in an activity would be considered a position, function,
responsibility, or part. 129 Thus, defendant's knowledge of his role
seems almost indistinguishable from the defendant's knowledge of his
assistance; however, such a conclusion would undermine the judicial
test because two of its elements would essentially focus on the same
inquiry, making parts of the test redundant and superfluous. This
redundancy results in a great deal of uncertainty as to what is
required to impose civil aiding and abetting liability. This uncertainty
provides the basis for the later parts of this Note, which illustrate the
highly problematic nature of the judicial test.
D. Evaluation "In Tandem'" The Sliding Scale
Securities law precedents also generated an analytical
methodology that departs further from the Restatement's test by
altering the analysis of liability, known as the "sliding scale" analysis.
The sliding scale analysis proposes that the second and third elements
of the test for civil aiding and abetting liability be analyzed in
tandem. 130 "In tandem" means that where there is stronger evidence
of the defendant's general awareness of the alleged wrongful activity,
less evidence of substantial assistance is required, and vice-versa. 13 1
129. See supra note 115.
130. Willis, supra note 128, at 1055. Recall that the second and third elements are
knowledge and assistance, respectively, and that this is the case under both the Restatement
formulation and the judicial test. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (judicial test);
supra note 68 and accompanying text.(Restatement approach).
131. E.g. In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484,
1495 (8th Cir. 1997) ("TMJ") ("We evaluate the second and third requirements in tandem-the
stronger the evidence of Dow Chemical's general awareness of the alleged tortious activity, the
less evidence of Dow Chemical's substantial assistance is required."). See also Witzman v.
Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn. 1999) ("Thus, "where there is a
minimal showing of substantial assistance, a greater showing of scienter is required."')
(emphasis added); Willis, supra note 128, at 1056 ("Where assistance is not clearly established,
the plaintiff must present more conclusive proof of knowledge, and vice versa."). "Scienter"
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The sliding scale, or in-tandem, analysis has been proposed as a way
of dealing with the difficulty of proving the knowledge and substantial
assistance elements. 132 Several courts have adopted the sliding scale
analysis. 133 Proponents of this approach contend that the reasoning
underlying sliding scale analysis comes from Woodward v. Metro Bank
35
of Dallas,13 4 an antifraud case under the federal securities laws.'
However, as was the case with the judicial test, courts have extended
the sliding scale analysis beyond securities cases into many other
types of claims, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, abuse
136
of process, wrongful death, fraud, products liability, and battery.
In re TMJ is one example of how some courts have applied the
sliding scale analysis in the general tort context. 137 In TMJ, the
Eighth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment to a parent
corporation on the ground that it could not be found to have aided and
abetted the tortious conduct of its subsidiary. In particular, the court
ruled that the plaintiff had failed to show both that the parent was
generally aware of the subsidiary's breach and that the parent
company knowingly and substantially assisted the wrongful act. 138 In
reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated the knowledge and
in tandem, 3 9
requirements
assistance
substantial
knowing
explaining that strong proof of one element can offset lesser proof of
the other. 140 The court found that there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to either element because the record was devoid of
14
any evidence establishing either element.

means "knowingly," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004), which makes it another word
for mens rea.

132. Willis, supra note 128, at 1056. The statement "the difficulty of the knowledge and
substantial assistance elements" refers to the possible inconsistency in the judicial test's
formulation that was highlighted at the close of the preceding section. See discussion supra Part
III.C.2.
133. E.g., In re TMJ, 113 F.3d at 1495. It is important to note that a court's adoption of the
sliding scale method of analysis has not necessarily depended upon that court's adoption of the
judicial test; some courts have applied "in tandem" analysis to the test as formulated in
Restatement Section 876(b). E.g., Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at 188 ('Thus, where there is minimal
showing of substantial assistance, a greater showing of scienter is required.") (emphasis added).
134. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
135. Willis, supra note 128, at 1056.
136. Id.
137. 113 F.3d at 1484.
138. Id. at 1495-96.
139. Id. at 1495.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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1. The Supposed Origin of the Sliding Scale Approach
The origins of the sliding scale test purportedly lie in
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas.142 Yet, upon closer examination,
Woodward turns out to provide no foundation for the sliding scale
analysis. Subsequent cases adopting Woodward's reasoning do not
provide any reasonable support to the sliding scale analysis, other
than through misguided reliance on Woodward.
In Woodward, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a
complaint alleging that the defendant-bank had aided and abetted
violations of the 1934 Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.143 The plaintiff
was Billie Jean Woodward, a then-recent divorc6e with "painfully
little business acumen."' 144 Starnes, a once successful and reputable
businessman, approached Woodward about investing in his company,
145
falsely telling her that the company's financial health was glowing.
Woodward's initial investment of $50,000 was subsequently
augmented when Starnes convinced her to cosign a note for $200,000
and to collateralize the note from Metro Bank of Dallas with $185,000
of marketable securities that she owned as well as a $50,000
certificate of deposit. 146 Ultimately, Starnes's company filed for
bankruptcy, Metro Bank sought collection from Woodward, and
14 7
Woodward sought judicial relief under the federal securities laws.
Specifically, Woodward sought to hold Metro Bank and one of its
officers, a Mr. Turnbull, liable for aiding and abetting Starnes's fraud
because of their knowledge of and failure to disclose the desperate
48
financial condition of Starnes's company.
Woodward held that Metro Bank of Dallas and Mr. Turnbull
were not liable for aiding and abetting Starnes's fraud on Woodward.
149
Woodward endorsed the judicial test over the Restatement's test,
142. 522 F.2d 84; see supranotes 134-135 and accompanying text.
143. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 97.
144. Id. at 87.
145. Id. at 87-88.
146. Id. at 88. Starnes told Woodward the loan was for working capital for the company;
however, the loan was actually made to Starnes personally, and used to satisfy the notices of
insufficient funds on the company's checking account. Id. In fact, the security pledged by
Woodward collateralized the $200,000 loan, as well as all of Starnes's other loans to Metro Bank.
Id. at 89.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also id. at 94 (noting that the plaintiffs claims were secondary because "[n]o one
suggests either that she was investing in the bank, or that the bank was investing in [Starnes's
company]").
149. Id. at 94-95 (quoting SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1974)):
[A] person may be held as an aider and abettor only if some other party has
committed a securities law violation, if the accused party had general awareness that
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reasoning that the latter would "pose a danger of over-inclusiveness
and seem to lose sight of the necessary connection to the securities
laws."150 The court justified the heightened liability requirement in
the securities context by the fear that a contrary rule would work to
impose liability on unsuspecting defendants, whose only "complicity"
was to conduct transactions in the ordinary course of business but
ultimately are found to have in some manner assisted another in
perpetrating securities fraud. 151 The court reasoned that such a result
would be analogous to holding civilly liable the postman who mails a
fraudulent letter, or even the company that manufactures the paper
on which the violating documents are printed.15 2 The Woodward court
reasoned that such a rule would be especially troubling considering
the fact that "[t]ransactions occur as a whole and only later are they
subjected to the scalpel of the legal dissector." 15 3 The court concluded
that the Restatement approach would be tantamount to the imposition
of strict liability on those who conduct business with violators of the
securities laws. 154 Such a rule would essentially make banks, such as
Metro Bank, insurers of those to whom the bank lends.1 55 The court
then quoted a passage Professor Ruder's oft-cited article that
highlights the importance of the knowledge requirement in securities
cases:
his role was part of an overall activity that is improper, and if the accused aiderabettor knowingly and substantially assisted the violation.
The Woodward court noted that its verbal formulation of the test for civil aiding and abetting
liability under the securities laws differed from the formulation used by other courts in the
securities law setting, which more resembled the Restatement formulation. Id. at 95 (referring
specifically to "a securities law violation" rather than "an independent wrong" was desirable, as
was reference to "awareness of a role in improper activity" rather than merely referring to
"knowledge of the wrong's existence").
150. Id. at 95 (emphasis added) (reasoning that "[o]ne could know of the existence of a
wrong' without being aware of his role in the scheme, and it is the participation that is at
issue.").
151. See id. ("If the alleged aider and abettor conducts what appears to be a transaction in
the ordinary course of his business, more evidence of his complicity is essential.").
152. Id.
153. Id. at 95; see also Willis, supra note 128, at 1055 (advocating a "middle ground
standard" of "constructive knowledge" as opposed to "mere negligence").
154. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96.
155. See id. at 96 (quoting David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 597, 630-31 (1972)):
If all that is required in order to impose liability for aiding and abetting is that illegal
activity under the securities laws exists and that a secondary defendant, such as a
bank, gave aid to that illegal activity, the act of loaning funds to the market
manipulator would clearly fall within that category and would expose the bank to
liability for aiding and abetting. Imposition of such liability upon banks would
virtually make them insurers regarding the conduct of insiders to whom they loan
money.
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If it is assumed that an illegal scheme existed and that the bank's loan or other activity
provided assistance to that scheme, some remaining distinguishing factor must be found
in order to prevent such automatic liability. The bank's knowledge of the illegal scheme
at the time it loaned the money or agreed to loan the money provides that additional
factor. Knowledge of wrongful purpose thus becomes a crucial element in aiding and
abetting or conspiracy cases. 156

The much-needed distinguishing factor to impose liability for
ordinary business transactions, Woodward concluded, is an explicit
requirement of actual knowledge 157 of the wrongful nature of the
activity assisted, 158 as opposed to merely requiring knowledge of the
assistance, i.e., the routine business transaction, standing alone. 159 To
avoid overextending the domain of aiding and abetting liability in the
securities context, Woodward demands proof that the defendant is
aware that he is playing a role within an improper course of

conduct. 160
In its holding with respect to the third element of aiding and
abetting liability, the Woodward court set forth the language that
some have interpreted as giving rise to a sliding scale analysis:
In a case combining silence/inaction with affirmative assistance, the degree of
knowledge required should depend on how ordinary the assisting activity is in the
business involved. If the evidence shows no more than transactions constituting the
daily grist of the mill, we would be loathe to find lOb-5 liability without clear proof of
intent to violate the securities laws. Conversely, if the method or transaction is atypical
or lacks business justification, it may be possible to infer the knowledge necessary for
aiding and abetting liability. In any case, the assistance must be substantial before
16 1
liability can be imposed under 10b-5.

While seeming to support the sliding scale analysis, this part of
the holding actually speaks only to the third element of the judicial
test for civil aiding and abetting liability;1 62 consequently, this part of
the holding is taken out of context when used as support for what has
come to be known as sliding scale analysis. Woodward, in short, only
supports a sliding scale approach to the third element itself, not
between the second and third elements in-tandem. This conclusion is

156. Id. (quoting same as note 155).
157. Some commentators have characterized the actual knowledge requirement as too
restrictive, making imposition of liability essentially impossible. Willis, supra note 128, at 1054.
The Woodward court delegitimizes such worries on the face of the opinion. 522 F.2d at 96
("Knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence, or by reckless conduct, but the proof
must demonstrate actual awareness of the party's role in the fraudulent scheme.").
158. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95-96.
159. Id. at 96.
160. Id. at 95.
161. Id. at 97 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
162. The Woodward court sought to impose a sliding scale within the third element of the
judicial test (the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the primary wrongdoer), so that
the more remote the assistance, the higher degree of scienter required to find liability. Id. at 95.
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evidenced by Woodward's own reasoning: "The scienter requirement
scales upward when activity is more remote; therefore, the assistance
rendered should be both substantial and knowing. A remote party
must not only be aware of his role, but he should also know when and
163
to what degree he is furthering the fraud."'
"Scienter" represents a legal term of art that is used as a
synonym for mens rea.164 Scienter, thus, does not refer to the
defendant's knowledge that the primary actor's conduct is wrongful,
but refers, instead, to whether or not the defendant possessed the
requisite "evil mind" when he provided the substantial assistance or
encouragement. The Woodward court noted that whether, or to what
extent, silence or inaction can fulfill the requirement is the most
problematic issue under the third element of aiding and abetting
securities law violations. 165 The court held that substantiality is a
function of the circumstances and that in a securities fraud case
combining silence or inaction with affirmative assistance, the degree
of scienter required should depend on how ordinary the assisting
activity is in the business involved. 166 In the securities law context,
"silence/inaction" refers to the alleged aider and abettor's failure to
167
disclose the fraud to the victim or take action to prevent the fraud.
"Affirmative assistance" refers to the alleged aider and abettor's

163. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The court in Woodward explicitly intended
that its formulation of the third element of the test for civil aiding and abetting liability for
violations of the federal securities laws differ, both in verbal formulation and application, from
the formulation set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(b). See id. at 95 n.23
(making note of the different Restatement standard advocated by a scholar).
164. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999). "Intent" is a problematic word given its
ambiguity; therefore, the trend in the criminal law is to the Model Penal Code approach.
165. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96. Commentators have also generated a substantial volume of
discussion on the issue of silence constituting grounds for aiding and abetting liability in tort.
See, e..g., Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and Abetting by Silence or
Inaction:An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14 passim (1993).
166. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 97 (footnotes and citations omitted):
When it is impossible to find any duty of disclosure, an alleged aider-abettor should be
found liable only if scienter of the high "conscious intent" variety can be proved.
Where some special duty of disclosure exists, then liability should be possible with a
lesser degree of scienter. In a case combining silence/inaction with affirmative
assistance, the degree of knowledge required should depend on how ordinary the
assisting activity is in the business involved.
Notice that the Woodward court uses the terms "knowledge" and "scienter" interchangeably in
the part of the opinion discussing the third element of the test for liability. Id. Despite the
interchangeable usage of the two words, the Woodward court is clearly referring to scienter and
using knowledge only insofar as it is synonymous with scienter because the court is discussing
the third element of the test for liability, which uses "knowingly," which is a level of scienter. Id.
Thus, the interchanging usage, while potentially confusing, should not take one off track
unnecessarily.
167. Id. at 96-97.
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commercial relationship with the primary wrongdoer. 168 Therefore,
Woodward does not support the sliding scale analysis because the only
sliding scale that Woodward sets forth is within the third element of
the test for liability, i.e. increasing the requisite degree of mental
culpability when the assistance is more remote or less substantial.
In reality, the approach to analyzing substantiality set forth in
Woodward is merely a subconscious application of the Restatement's
test for substantiality.
A fact-specific balancing to determine
substantiality, as in Woodward, is nothing new because it is
essentially the same as the original five factor test under the
Restatement approach, which analyzes the sufficiency of the
assistance provided by weighing the defendant's remoteness and his
state of mind. 169 Recall that the comment to Section 876(b) provides
that with respect to the substantiality element of liability:
The assistance of or participation by the defendant may be so slight that he is not liable
for the act of another. In determining this, the nature of the act encouraged, the
amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence or absence
at the time of the
1 70
tort, his relation to the other and his state of mind are all considered.

Thus, one can see how Woodward's analytical formulation is
best analogized to the substantiality analysis under the third element
of the Restatement. First, the Restatement's formulation recognizes
that the assistance in some cases may be so slight that liability may
not be imposed, which would seem directly applicable to situations
where the defendant's assistance is, as characterized in Woodward,
"remote." Second, the Restatement's five-factor test further takes into
account the remoteness of the assistance by its express focus on the
following factors: "the amount of assistance given by the defendant,"
the defendant's "presence or absence at the time of the tort," and the
defendant's "relation to the other." Therefore, in a routine business
transaction, such as the banking transactions in Woodward, the
defendant's provision of ordinary business services in an arm's length
transaction with a client likely would be insufficient, standing alone,
under the Restatement's formulation, as it would fail to be substantial
1 71
under the Restatement's five-factor test for substantial assistance.

168. Id.
169. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d. (1979) (emphasis added).
171. By "standing alone," I mean that there is no showing of the defendant possessing an evil
state of mind, and the nature of the assistance provided through the routine business transaction
is not alarming. The factor focusing on the defendant's relation to the primary actor likely
renders the fact that the transaction is at arm's-length and in the ordinary course of business, as
opposed to transactions between familiar parties within a criminal syndicate, very important to
avoidance of liability.
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In short, claims analogous to those against the defendants in
Woodward would fail under the Restatement because the remoteness
of the assistance would render such assistance insubstantial under the
third element of Section 876(b).
2. Why the Sliding Scale Analysis is Erroneous
Woodward, the supposed source of sliding scale analysis, turns
out not to support it but instead to support independent analysis of
the second and third elements of liability. In any event, sliding scale
analysis should be rejected because it undermines fundamental
elements of aiding and abetting liability.
The fundamental basis for aiding and abetting liability is that
the defendant both (1) knows of the primary actor's wrongful conduct;
and (2) substantially assists or encourages the primary wrongdoer to
so act. By contrast, the sliding scale analysis provides that if, for
example, the evidence is very strong that one knows of the underlying
wrong that evidence of even a small degree of assistance would be
sufficient to render the defendant liable for civil aiding and abetting.
Thus, almost any degree of assistance could be enough to be
considered substantial assistance under the sliding scale. But, if the
assistance provided was negligible, then how can it also be deemed
substantial? It is illogical to make the determination of whether the
assistance was substantial turn upon the defendant's knowledge. The
logical approach is to analyze the defendant's knowledge and
assistance independently.
The defendant's knowledge and assistance require independent
examination to maintain the proper scope of liability; otherwise the
scope of liability may become so broad as to render the theory of civil
aiding and abetting potentially draconian. 172 First, allowing a high
level of knowledge to offset a small degree of assistance might have
socially undesirable results.
Second, the sliding scale approach
presents the danger of potentially stifling commerce through too much
liability, which is the very danger that Woodward sought to avoid.
The sliding scale presents a hazard of socially undesirable
results by frustrating the long-standing public policy that favors legal,
medical, and religious services being both available and competently
provided to those who need them. For example, suppose a priest has
actual knowledge that a member of his parish, Tony S., is a primary
leader of a large criminal syndicate. In an attempt to mend Tony's

172. "Draconian," as it is used here, means "harsh; severe." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 508
(7th ed. 1999).
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weary soul, the priest ministers to Tony over a number of years by
hearing his confessions, providing spiritual counseling, and even
attending cookouts at his house. Tony never shares any specifics of
future activities with the priest, as the ministry is focused almost
exclusively on reconciliation and rehabilitation. 173 The ministry helps
Tony personally by, among other things, making him a better family
man and a more compassionate person, especially to animals. The
ministry also helps Tony professionally by slightly easing the mental
anguish and guilt he sometimes feels. Even without the ministry,
however, Tony would still continue in his role in the syndicate,
although his mental distress would somewhat detract from his ability
to lead the syndicate. The priest ministers to Tony for a number of
years before Tony injures the plaintiff, but during those years of
ministry, Tony never turns away from his role in the syndicate and
even rises substantially in rank. The ministry that the priest provides
to Tony is typical of the ministry he provides to many other members
of his parish. The reader can guess where I am going with this
illustration: By providing such routine assistance in the ordinary
course of his business, should the priest thereby be rendered liable for
aiding and abetting Tony's ongoing wrongful conduct simply because
the priest had actual knowledge? Under the sliding scale analysis, the
priest may indeed be liable. 174 On one end of the sliding scale there is
incredible weight: a strong showing of actual knowledge of ongoing
wrongful conduct. Thus, the other end of the scale, assistance or
encouragement, perhaps could be satisfied by a minute degree of
assistance, such as the priest's continuing ministry to Tony, despite
his failure to change his ways. Under the Restatement, the priest
likely would not be liable because his assistance would not be held
substantial under the five-factor test.175

173. Meaning that no form of duty to report arises from the priest's ministry to Tony, either
statutory or otherwise. Cf. Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334,
345 (Cal. 1976) (holding that once a psychotherapist determines or reasonably should have
determined that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger, notwithstanding the general
rule at common law that one person owes neither a duty to control the conduct of another nor a
duty to warn those endangered by such conduct).
174. Availability of liability by the priest assumes, of course, that the priest is not protected
by some form of charitable immunity, which is likely the case because "[m]ost American courts or
legislatures have now rejected the immunity" and "[t]he Restatement simply says no such
immunity exists." DOBBS, supra note 26, § 282, at 763 (footnotes omitted).
175. Lack of liability could exist for several reasons. The most persuasive reason would be
the priest's "state of mind," which was to do his job by ministering to Tony, as opposed to an evil
mind intending to bring about the wrongful result. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt.
d (1979). Other reasons include the following: (1) the provision of ordinary religious services
likely would not be a sufficient "amount of assistance given;" (2) the priest was not present at the
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By analogy, the same claims could be brought against a
psychiatrist, who provides counseling and medication to Tony in an
attempt to treat his repeated panic attacks, provided that she knows
who he is and what he does for a living. In fact, perhaps a stronger
case could be made against the mental health personnel because the
panic attacks, which without warning render him temporarily
physically incapacitated, likely are a bigger hindrance to Tony's
leadership than his religious butterflies. The circle of liability also
could be expanded to include Tony's retained legal counsel.176
In the case of either the priest or the psychiatrist, the
imposition of liability achieves socially undesirable results. Public
policy favors persons receiving the legal, medical, and religious
services that they need. 177 Under the sliding scale approach, the
providers of such services would likely become decidedly apprehensive
of learning about the recipients of their services; however, competent
provision of such services often depends upon the provider being
aware of the very details that providers would seek to avoid learning
in order to avoid liability. Another troubling aspect of such a result is
that persons with the greatest need for such services would be the
people whom providers would most seek to avoid. A person in Tony's
situation is the very sort of person that society wants to receive
time the wrong was committed; and (3) his relationship to Tony is more that of a priest, than of
an accomplice. Id.
176. Placing liability upon retained legal counsel seems less problematic than liability upon
ongoing medical and religious providers. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 13
(providing that a lawyer must consult with his client if he believes the client wants him to violate
the Model Rules).
177. Evidentiary privileges protecting communications in these settings demonstrate judicial
and legislative recognition of the desirability of these services being available to persons in need
without such persons having to fear later legal consequences; however, with respect to legal
services, there are crime-fraud exceptions to the attorney-client privilege and the rules of
professional conduct governing confidentiality that are designed to prevent the use of legal
services to further the commission of a crime. Clark v. U.S. 289 U.S. 1, 15 (U.S. 1933)
(discussing crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(2), (3) (allowing lawyers to reveal confidential information to prevent the client from
committing a fraud or crime using the lawyer's service that is reasonably certain to result in
substantial financial injury); Marc I. Steinberg, Lawyer Liability After Sarbanes-Oxley-Has the
Landscape Changed?, 3 WYO. L. REV. 371, 371-72 (2003) (footnotes omitted):
Largely due to massive corporate debacles that wreaked havoc on investors and the
integrity of the U.S. securities markets, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley or SOA). Among its many significant provisions, Congress
mandated that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgate a rule
focusing on attorney "up the ladder" reporting with respect to a corporate client when
faced with a material violation of fiduciary duty, securities law, or similar violation by
a subject corporate constituent (such as a director, officer or employee). Following
Congress' directive, the SEC in 2003 adopted standards of professional conduct.
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religious and psychiatric counseling. At the same time, the most
notorious persons, such as a publicly reputed mobster like Tony, may
be unable to secure such services at all because providers may seek to
avoid such persons altogether. Therefore, the sliding scale approach
presents the danger of creating a socially undesirable result:
interference with the public policy that strongly favors adequate
availability and competent provision of legal, medical, and religious
services to persons in need of such services.,
Just as with the priest illustration above, under the sliding
scale approach, businesses face the danger of civil liability for aiding
and abetting for routine business transactions if there is sufficient
evidence of the defendant's actual knowledge of the primary actor's
breach of duty. Under the sliding scale analysis, a business shown to
have a high level of knowledge of the primary wrongdoer's conduct
could be liable for providing a very small degree of assistance or
encouragement, The potential for liability is broader for businesses
than it would be for the priest because the proprietors of the business
may have the knowledge of their employees imputed to the business
under principles of agency master-servant law, whereas the priest is
only potentially liable for his own knowledge.
To illustrate, suppose that the defendant is the sole proprietor
of a gas station in a mid-sized city with several other gas stations. A
cashier at the gas station sells gas to Tony, and there is substantial
evidence that because of Tony's notoriety, the cashier knows Tony is a
primary leader in a large criminal syndicate.
The evidence of
knowledge is based upon the clerk's admission that he reads the entire
newspaper every day, combined with the fact that the newspaper
frequently features pictures of Tony and descriptions of his leadership
of the criminal syndicate. Does the cashier then become liable to
plaintiffs injured by wrongs that Tony could foreseeably commit while
using the tank of gas? Holding a mere clerk at a gas station liable to
unknown and unidentified others seems rather harsh, given that all
the clerk did was sell a tank of gas, a material readily available on the
market, to a person widely-known to be a mobster. As discussed
above, however, the clerk likely could be held liable under a forthright
application of the sliding scale analysis. Of course, if the clerk were
found liable, the proprietor of the business would likely be found liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. As a result, the proprietor
and the clerk would thereby be the insurer of potential plaintiffs that
Tony may injure in the ordinary course of his own business as he carts
around town in his big SUV using the tank of gas. Such a result is
troubling. In addition, such a result is contrary to Woodward, the
claimed source of the sliding scale analysis, in which the court sought
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to avoid civil aiding and abetting liability for routine business
transactions. Woodward's concern about after the fact dissection of a
transaction likely would be realized in a case such as this. 178 A
different result would be reached under the Restatement test because
the sale of a readily available good, at the usual price, and in the
ordinary course of business, likely would not constitute substantial
179
assistance.
In sum, the sliding scale initially was crafted by the courts to
limit civil aiding and abetting liability of defendants whose
involvement in the primary actor's wrongful conduct was remote,
leveraging the usual difficultly of proving knowledge in such cases to
defeat liability. The above discussion demonstrates, however, that the
sliding scale, if followed to its logical conclusion, may actually expand
liability so as to give rise to undesirable results.
V. THE PROPER TEST FOR CIVIL AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
With the dearth of coherent precedent and the increasing
importance of civil aiding and abetting, courts need a clearer test for
liability. 8 0 This Part proposes such a test through synthesis and
critical analysis of relevant precedent and commentaries, as well as
through application of basic legal principles to fill in the many gaps
that currently exists. The appropriate test will render a defendant
liable for civil aiding and abetting where it is shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the primary wrongdoer
committed a wrongful act that harmed the plaintiff; (2) the defendant
was generally aware of the primary wrongdoer's breach of duty; (3) the
defendant provided the primary wrongdoer with substantial
assistance or encouragement in the breach of duty; and (4) the harm
that occurred was within the scope of the risk created by breaching
the duty of which the defendant was aware. As a matter of law, of

178. Specifically, in attempting to prove circumstantially the clerk's knowledge of Tony's
mafia affiliation, the plaintiff would have the benefit of the ability to use a line of argument
based upon the contention that everyone knows Tony is a mobster, especially a person who
habitually reads the newspaper from cover to cover.
179. First, the amount of assistance provided to Tony by selling him a tank of gas is
minimal, especially if he bought at the market price and could readily have bought it elsewhere.
Thus, the act of selling the gas provided little assistance. The assistance that having gas in the
car provides in a particular legal wrong, such as extortion, is also very slight. Second, the clerk
would not be present at the time of Tony's wrongful conduct. Third, the clerk likely would have
no relation to Tony other than perhaps exchanging casual greetings as Tony paid for the gas.
Fourth, the clerk's state of mind was not one intending to bring about a legal wrong, although it
may be contended that the clerk knew with a substantial certainty that one might occur.
180. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.

2005]

CIVIL AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY

279

course, the defendant's provision of assistance itself must have been a
breach of duty to the plaintiff; otherwise, the plaintiff lacks standing.
A. PrimaryActor's Legal Harm to Plaintiff
Civil aiding and abetting unquestionably requires that the
primary wrongdoer commit a wrongful act that caused an injury to a
plaintiff.1 8 1 "Wrongful act," of course, refers to an illegal act, not
simply an act that is morally reprehensible. A "wrongful act" is
defined as "an act taken in violation of a legal duty; an act that
unjustly infringes on another's rights."'18 2
Recall that the law
protects-in the broadest sense-the rights of both society and
individuals through criminal and civil law, respectively. 8 3 Thus, a
person's breach of duty may be a violation of a criminal or a civil duty,
or perhaps a violation of both; moreover, the duty may arise from the
184
common law or from a statute.
In most cases, duty turns upon traditional principles, and the
existence of a duty poses no substantial inquiry.18 5 If the primary
181. The Restatement, the judicial test, and the sliding scale all contain this requirement.
Inherent within the text of the Restatement is the requirement of a duty: the aiding and abetting
defendant must "know that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty .. " RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (emphasis added). The judicial test requires the same.
Specifically, courts have held that "the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful
act that causes an injury." Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added).
182. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1604 (7th ed. 1999) (synonymous with "wrongful conduct");
see also infra note 186 (noting that legally wrongful conduct is not necessarily synonymous with
immoral conduct).
183. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
184. There is another interesting issue with respect to duty, which lies outside the scope of
this Note: whose duty must be breached? Specifically, is the relevant duty the one owed to the
plaintiff by the primary wrongdoer, the aider and abettor, or are both relevant? The first
possibility obviously seems relevant. For example, if the defendant yells "Kill him!... Hit him
more!" while the primary actor batters the plaintiff, the defendant is aiding and abetting the
primary actor's breach of duty to the plaintiff. Rael v. Cadena, 604 P.2d 822, 822 (N.M. Ct. App.
1979). Whether or not the defendant's assistance renders him a participant so as to breach his
own duty to the plaintiff is unclear. A more difficult question is presented by the situation where
the defendant owes a special duty, i.e. an affirmative duty to rescue, but the primary actor does
not. For example, assume a parent has a duty to rescue his child where the rescue poses no
danger to the parent. Can the parent be held liable as an aider and abettor for dissuading the
primary actor, who has no duty to rescue, from rescuing the imperiled child? In other words, can
a defendant aid and abet another in breaching the defendant's own duty to the plaintiff? The
answer to this question is perhaps unimportant, as the plaintiff likely just would simply sue the
defendant for his own negligence rather than proceeding under a claim of civil aiding and
abetting.
185. See generally, John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998) (noting one has a duty of ordinary care to those with whom the
law has recognized a relationship warranting such a duty). One has a general duty not to
commit an intentional tort against another. Similarly, the criminal law imposes a duty upon
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actor owes no duty to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff cannot establish
an aiding and abetting claim against the defendant. Suppose that
Paul, the primary actor, sits on the ground beside a pond, enjoying a
cold beer while watching a stranger drown. Paul could save the
drowning stranger without risk but would rather watch her drown.
Suppose further that Don, the aider, arrives, applauds Paul for
watching the woman drown, and offers Paul a comfortable chair and
another beer.
Given that, in most jurisdictions, Paul owes no
affirmative duty to rescue a stranger, Paul has not committed a
legally wrongful act. 8 6 Consequently, Don could not have aided and
abetted Paul because there was no tort to aid and abet. Paul
committed no legal wrong.
Requiring a completed tort against the plaintiff is one way that
civil aiding and abetting liability departs from its criminal
counterpart. 8 7 By providing the victim with a private right of action,
tort law concerns itself primarily with empowering the victim to seek
redress for a completed and legally recognized wrong done to her.
Thus, for example, the fact that the primary actor behaved carelessly
toward a plaintiff is not, standing alone, sufficient to impose liability
upon either the primary or secondary actors, as the plaintiff has not
established injury or causation. Criminal law, on the other hand,
imposes punishment for inchoate crimes, such as attempt.1 8 8 Because
a plaintiff seeking to impose aiding and abetting liability must make
out a full case within a case and because tort law does not recognize
inchoate wrongs, the plaintiff must prove the commission of a

persons not to act in specified ways, e.g., "A person is guilty of arson ... if he starts a fire or
causes an explosion with the purpose of: (a) destroying a building or occupied structure of
another." MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(a) (1962).

186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 ('The fact that the actor realizes or should
realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action."). The commentator goes on to state that the result of this
rule is that "one human being, seeing a fellow man in dire peril, is under no legal obligation to
aid him, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigar, and watch the other drown." Id. cmt. c (noting
further the moral reprehensibility of such a rule but the continued legal viability of the rule
nonetheless).
187. Id. § 876(b). In the criminal context, the requirement that the underlying legal wrong
actually have occurred is not necessary under many modern recodifications, which impose
liability for attempts to aid. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1962) ("aids or agrees
or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing" the offense); see also LAFAVE,
supra note 31, § 6.7, at 624 (stating several modern codes have adopted MPC approach). This
distinction between criminal and tort liability likely finds its basis in the principles discussed,
supra, notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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completed tort even to be eligible to establish another's liability for
89
aiding and abetting.
Apart from requiring both standing to sue the primary actor
and a completed tort against the plaintiff, a plaintiff also must have
standing to sue for aiding and abetting. Generally, the primary actor's
breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff suffices to establish standing;
therefore, in most cases, standing poses no substantial barrier to
aiding and abetting liability. However, standing for civil aiding and
abetting liability may not exist when the duty owed to the plaintiff by
the primary actor arises from a statute-based private right of action.
Perhaps the best example of this is Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver.190
In Central Bank, the United States Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff may not maintain a claim for civil aiding and abetting under
Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b). 19 1 This decision shocked most
observers, as every circuit court of appeals had recognized such a right
of action. 192 The Court reasoned that, unlike in the criminal context,
Congress had not enacted a general civil aiding and abetting
statute. 19 3 With that in mind, the Court held that "when Congress
enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages
from a private defendant for the defendant's violation of some
statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may
also sue aiders and abettors."'194 Accepted canons of construction
provide that the statutory text controls the definition of conduct
covered by the statute, 195 and Congress, presumptively, knows how to
legislate; therefore, the statute must indicate an intention to create
196
civil aiding and abetting liability.

189. "Case within a case" is a phrase often used to describe a malpractice plaintiffs burden
of proving a lack of damages but for the defendant's action. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 486, at
1390-91. I use the phrase in reference to the civil aiding and abetting plaintiffs burden of
proving a primary wrong, which is much easier to establish because it involves proving
something alleged to have occurred already as opposed to proving the probability that something
would have happened but for the defendant, which is a much more speculative undertaking.
190. 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir 2003) (an example
where aiding and abetting liability does not exist).
191. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
192. Id. at 193 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 182.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 175.
196. Id. at 177. Courts give particular weight to (1) use of language the court has previously
found sufficient to impose civil aiding and abetting liability; (2) whether the conduct proscribed
by the statute could sensibly extend to aiders and abettors; (3) how far the statute has already
been stretched; and (4) whether other private causes of action within the statutory scheme create
private rights of action. Id. at 180-85.
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Over the years, circuit courts have interpreted Central Bank
rather narrowly, limiting the holding primarily to the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act context. For example, the Seventh Circuit held in Boim
v. Quranic Literacy Institute that two specific anti-terrorism statutes
allowed civil aiding and abetting liability, although the text of the
statute did not use the words "aiding or abetting."'197 Specifically, the
Boim court held that Congress intended liability to extend to aiders
and abettors of terrorism. 198 The Boim court distinguished Central
Bank because the anti-terrorism statute provided an express private
right of action, and therefore, the Boim court was not required to stack
one inferred right upon another, as was required for civil aiding and
abetting liability under Section 10(b). 199
While there is no
presumption of civil aiding and abetting liability under a federal
statute, courts still may imply such liability, despite a lack of explicit
textual support.
The first element can be summarized as follows: the plaintiff
must show that the primary actor breached a duty owed by him to the
plaintiff, which resulted in a completed tort against the plaintiff, and
which provides standing for the plaintiff to sue the defendant for
aiding and abetting.
B. The "FactualKnowledge" Requirement
The second requirement to establish civil aiding and abetting
liability is that the defendant was generally aware of the primary
wrongdoer's breach of duty at the time the defendant rendered
assistance. This requirement will hereinafter be referred to as the
"factual knowledge" requirement. 200
The factual knowledge
197. Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing
CentralBank).
198. Id. The court explained its reasoning as such:
[A]lithough the words 'aid and abet' do not appear in the statute, Congress purposely
drafted the statute to extend liability to all points along the causal chain of terrorism.
It is not much of a leap to conclude that Congress intended to extend section 2333
liability beyond those persons directly perpetrating acts of violence. Indeed, the
statute itself defines international terrorism so broadly-to include activities that
'involve' violent acts-that we must construe it carefully to meet the constitutional
standards regarding vagueness and First Amendment rights of association.
199. Id. at 1019 (noting that courts would have had to stack inferences by creating a private
right of action under § 10(b) of the 1993 Securities Act and then "extending liability to aiders and
abettors in rule 10b-5 actions").
200. I have termed this element the "factual knowledge" requirement to distinguish the
inquiry from the knowledge analysis under the third prong, i.e., whether the defendant
knowingly and substantially assisted the principal wrong. "Knowingly" under the third prong
resembles the scienter or mens rea one possesses when providing assistance, whereas knowledge
under the second prong represents awareness of wrongful conduct by a primary actor. Thus, the
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requirement encompasses the following key concerns: (1) the degree of
knowledge the defendant is required to possess of the breach of duty
in order for liability to attach; and (2) the "facts" that the defendant is
required to know under the factual knowledge requirement.
1. The Requisite Degree of Knowledge of the Breach of Duty
The degree of legal knowledge required to satisfy the factual
knowledge requirement presents a surprisingly challenging issue and
represents perhaps the most convoluted issue in the law of civil aiding
and abetting. The authors of the Restatement intended that aiding
and abetting liability would be predicated on the fact that the
defendant "knows" of a breach of duty. 20 1
The judicial test's
requirement of a "general awareness" accords with the Restatement
with respect to knowledge of the breach of duty. 20 2 Specifically what it
means to "know" is not easily ascertainable, however, especially since
knowledge is rarely relevant in tort.203 Courts have defined at least
three different mental states as satisfying the "knows" requirement:
20 4
actual knowledge, reckless knowledge, and constructive knowledge.
Actual knowledge, as the highest possible standard, certainly
satisfies the factual knowledge requirement. Moreover, ordinary
second element pertains to the defendant's factual knowledge of the circumstances, not his
intents or purposes.
201. The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(b) provides a single knowledge
requirement within its text: that defendant "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach
of duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, the comment
to Section 876(b) similarly provides that liability of the defendant requires that "the act
encouraged is known to be tortious." Id. § 876(b) cmt. d (emphasis added).
202. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text (laying out second element of judicial
test).
203. Neither the text of nor the comment to Section 876(b) provide any definition of
knowledge. Following general canons of construction, one would look to other sections of the
Restatement for a definition, but the American Law Institute provides none, even while
providing definitions of intent, recklessness, and negligence. Perhaps the blame for the failure to
define knowledge should rest upon the general structure of traditional tort law, which divided
torts into two categories: intentional torts and negligence. The focus here is, as would be
presumed, the legal definition of knowledge; philosophy of what it means to know something or if
one truly ever can know anything will be, appropriately, saved for philosophers.
204. Actual knowledge, as the term implies, means "Direct or clear knowledge, as
distinguished from constructive knowledge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (7th ed. 1999).
Reckless knowledge describes "a defendant's belief that there is a risk that a prohibited
circumstance exists, regardless of which the defendant goes on to take the risk." Id. at 877.
Constructive knowledge constitutes "[k]nowledge that one using reasonable care or diligence
should have, and therefore, that is attributed by law to a given person," i.e., facts that an
ordinary person either knew or reasonably should have known under the circumstancesessentially a negligence standard. Id. at 876. Actual and reckless knowledge both include an
element of subjective knowledge, i.e., the defendant actually must know either a certain fact or
the existence of a risk, respectively; however, constructive knowledge is an objective inquiry.
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parlance of "knows" would favor actual knowledge to the exclusion of
the others. 20 5 The real issue is whether something less than actual
knowledge, such as reckless or constructive knowledge, might also
satisfy the factual knowledge requirement.
Beyond the verbal formulations,
several courts and
commentators advocate the use of nothing less than actual knowledge
in the securities law context. 20 6 These authorities contend that
anything less than actual knowledge "would cast too wide a net,
bringing under it parties involved in nothing more than routine
business transactions." 20 7 The Eighth Circuit provided the following
illustration:
For instance, without the knowledge element, a party who, in the normal course of
business, transmits documents necessary to consummate a sale may be held liable as an
aider and abettor if the transmission somehow aided a securities laws violation.
Knowingly engaging in a customary business transaction which2 0incidentally
aids the
8
violation of securities laws, without more, will not lead to liability.

Professor Ruder also emphasized the importance of actual
knowledge as a way of preventing liability of innocent parties
conducting ordinary business:
If it is assumed that an illegal scheme existed and that the bank's loan or other activity
provided assistance to that scheme, some remaining distinguishingfactor must be found
in order to prevent such automatic liability. The bank's knowledge of the illegal scheme
at the time it loaned the money or agreed to loan the money provides that additional
factor. Knowledge of wrongful
purpose thus becomes a crucial element in aiding and
209
abetting or conspiracy cases.

The reluctance of courts to extend liability to persons
conducting ordinary business transactions who lack actual knowledge
of the wrongful activity is understandable, particularly where the
business transactions are rather remote, such as a bank loaning
money to a borrower who is perpetrating a fraud upon some third
party; however, reckless knowledge may indeed satisfy the factual
knowledge requirement because the insistence upon actual knowledge
may not withstand scrutiny when applied to transactions between
210
parties who are very familiar with one another.
205. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1993).
206. Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment, Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation:
Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of FiduciaryDuty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 213,
236 n.78 (1996).
207. Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459 (8th Cir. 1991).
208. Id.
209. Ruder, supra note 155, at 630-31 (emphasis added). This example has been very
influential to courts analyzing claims of aiding and abetting securities law violations through
ordinary business transactions. E.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th
Cir. 1975).
210. Id.
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For example suppose Don Aider owns a local hardware store
and sells his brother-in-law Paul Actor, who Don strongly suspects but
does not know is a burglar, the following items: a crow bar, a set of
bolt-cutters, and a blow torch. Assuming that Paul in fact commits a
burglary and that the tools substantially assisted him, would
imposing liability upon Don be justified for his conscious disregard of a
known risk of tortious behavior by Paul? One could answer either
way. On the one hand, one could contend that Don has no duty to
protect unknown others from a risk posed by Paul's tortious conduct
and that imposing liability on Don would be allowing liability through
the back door. 2 11 On the other hand, one could argue that Don's
decision to disregard such a high risk deflates any contention that Don
was an innocent party conducting ordinary business, which is the type
of defendant upon whom proponents of the actual knowledge
2 12
requirement base their arguments.
Constructive knowledge is likely insufficient to satisfy the
factual knowledge requirement. The verbal formulation of the judicial
test, which is used by most courts, indicates that mere constructive
knowledge likely does not suffice for civil aiding and abetting liability.
The second element of the judicial test provides that "the defendant
must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or
tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance." 2 13 So
courts have provided that "generally aware" constitutes the proper
verbal formulation rather than the Restatement's use of "knows."
When combined with the ordinary parlance of "knows," the judicial
application of the Restatement likely eliminates constructive
knowledge as a possibility, as being "aware" likely requires having

211. Under these facts, imposing civil aiding and abetting liability might be considered "back
door" because Don could not be held liable in negligence, given the general rule of no duty to
protect the plaintiff from harm by another.
212. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 6.7, at 628 (quoting Blackmun v. U.S .). Specifically, imposing
liability for the sale of burglary tools to persons reasonably suspected to be burglars does not give
rise to interference with the legitimate marketplace because the aider and abettor is consciously
disregarding a known substantial risk and no longer seems sympathetic. This is especially true
considering Halberstam's prediction of an increasing trend of liability for concerted action
liability in order to deal with these exact sorts of situations. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472,
489 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
213. E.g., id. at 477 (emphasis added). Judge Wald explained that this verbal mutation of
the Restatement Section 876(b)'s knowledge requirement developed in the context of aiding and
abetting violations of securities laws. Id. at 478 n.8.
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actual knowledge, 2 14 leaving reckless knowledge as the only potential
2 15
alternative to actual knowledge.
2. Defendant's general awareness of his role
The second issue under the factual knowledge requirement
concerns what "facts" the defendant must know to meet the factual
knowledge requirement. Under the Restatement formulation, the
inquiry into the "facts" required to be known is fairly straightforward.
The inquiry focuses on the defendant's general knowledge of the
circumstances. That is to say, the defendant must know that the
primary actor's conduct is a breach of duty, not that a wrong will
result from the conduct. Knowledge of the result involves estimation
of the causation and damages that will result from the primary actor's
breach of duty; however, the defendant is only required to know that
the primary actor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and is not
required to know the particular result that will occur. 2 16 Thus, the
defendant does not have to know specifically that her lover is
committing burglaries; knowledge that he is involved in a continuing
criminal enterprise would suffice. 21 7 The defendant's knowledge of the
circumstances need not be specific; general knowledge will suffice.
Returning to the burglary example, the defendant did not have to

214. Merriam-Webster defines "aware" as "marked by realization, perception, or knowledge."
(emphasis added). WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 152 (1993).

215. Although the common parlance of "aware" and "knows" lends strong support to the
conclusion that actual knowledge alone suffices, I contend that one cannot entirely eliminate
recklessness as a possibility because the ordinary parlance of "willful," "done deliberately,"
supports defining that term as "knowingly." MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?willful (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). The common practice of
the courts is to treat "willful" and "reckless" as synonyms.
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979); e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (Kan. 1968); Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 401 (Okla. 1958)..
Hirshman v. Emme, 84 N.W. 482, 483 (Minn. 1900). In Hirshman, the plaintiff, "an inoffensive
Hebrew peddler," was traveling on the road in front of the home of defendant Julius Emme. 84.
N.W. at 483. As plaintiff passed the home, a group of men, including the defendant, decided to
haze the plaintiff. Id. '"The evidence [was] practically conclusive that none of the parties
intended to injure the plaintiff physically when the hazing commenced, and that [Julius] so
understood it." Id. Notwithstanding the nonviolent result intended originally, the hazing
ultimately resulted in the plaintiff receiving serious injury from being struck on the head with a
club by Julius's nephew, Theodore Emme. 84. N.W. at 483. Although Julius did not intend to
injure the plaintiff physically and did not strike the damaging blow, the court held Julius liable
for the plaintiffs injuries. Id. The court reasoned that the actions and conduct of the group of
men, including Julius, "encouraged, instigated, and incited Theodore Emme to strike the
plaintiff' because the group's conduct "naturally tended to incite a hot-headed and somewhat
intoxicated youth to go to extremes in the gentle pastime of Jew-baiting, in which ... [Julius] had
taken an active part." Id.
217. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
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know all of the specific facts of her lover's conduct; the court held that
her general knowledge of the circumstances was sufficient to infer the
218
proper degree of knowledge of her lover's criminal enterprise.
Obviously, the defendant's knowledge of the circumstances is
determinative, not the defendant's knowledge that the law defines
such circumstances as wrongful. 2 19 One could make the same
220
arguments regarding willfully blind aiders and abettors.
One must determine the viability of the judicial test's
reformulation of the second prong: "the defendant must be generally
aware of his role as a part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at
the time that he provides the assistance." 221 As mentioned above,
courts grafted this heightened requirement to curb the possibility of
overinclusive liability in the securities area, as the Restatement's
formulation required mere knowledge of a breach of duty. 222 This
narrowing was necessary in the securities law context given the
strictness of liability and the potential adverse effects on commerce
beyond what Congress intended, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's
rejection of civil aiding and abetting liability for securities laws in
223
Central Bank.
The defendant's awareness of his role in the wrongful activity
adds relatively little to the analysis of culpability. To know of his role
in the wrongful activity, the defendant must first know of the
existence of the wrongful activity, as the Restatement requires.
Knowledge of the wrongful activity's existence should suffice to satisfy
the factual knowledge requirement. The proponents of the judicial
test attempt to justify its formulation by stating: "One could know of
the existence of a 'wrong' without being aware of his role in the
scheme, and it is the participation that is at issue."224
This

218. Id. For a discussion of the key facts of the Halberstam case, see infra notes 279-283 and
accompanying text.
219. In other words, one could not argue a mistake of law defense to defeat the second prong
of civil aiding and abetting liability.
220. "Willful blindness" is defined as "[d[eliberate avoidance of knowledge of a crime,
especially by failing to make a reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing despite being
aware that it is highly probable." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (7th ed. 1999). See also
LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 6.7, at 628 n.85 (discussing criminal law aiding and abetting case
where liability was found because defendant was willfully blind).
221. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477 (emphasis added). Judge Wald explained the origin of this
verbal mutation of the Restatement Section 876(b)'s knowledge requirement developed in the
context of aiding and abetting violations of the securities laws. Id. at 478, n.8.
222. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
223. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994); see
also supra notes 107-108.
224. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975).
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justification, however, fails to persuade because participation speaks
to a completely different inquiry: substantial assistance.
Furthermore, the second prong of the judicial test becomes
increasingly suspect when considered in light of the third prong of
that test: the aider and abettor knowingly and substantially assists
the wrongful activity.
If one accepts the requirement of the
defendant's awareness of his role for the second prong, then the use of
"knowingly" as a modifier of assistance under the third prong becomes
superfluous, and tends to blur the elements of the test, as evidenced
by misguided courts doing "in tandem" analysis. Therefore, the
judicial test properly may be viewed as a disguised version of the
sliding scale analysis that was rejected out of hand above. 225 If courts
truly worry about casting a net so wide that it captures innocent
persons, then they should focus on awareness of participation in one
place, not two. 226 And if the courts are to focus on awareness of
participation in one area, it should be under the balancing test of the
third prong, where the list of variables already includes the
defendant's state of mind. 227 Even if the dubious proposition that the
judicial test's extension of the factual knowledge requirement to the
defendant's knowledge of his role does reduce liability proves correct,
the strictness of liability in the securities laws should not provide a
shield to those who assist common law torts or criminal acts.
C. The SubstantialAssistance or EncouragementRequirement:
Redefined
Typically, the primary issue in a case of civil aiding and
abetting is whether the assistance or encouragement was
substantial. 228 To satisfy the substantial assistance requirement, the
judicial test provides that "the defendant must knowingly and
substantially assist the principal violation." 229 Thus, the inquiry
under the judicial test does not focus simply upon the significance of
the assistance, as with the Restatement, but also focuses upon the
225. See supra Part III.D.2.
226. Otherwise there is a risk that where there is a plethora of evidence regarding a
defendant's actual knowledge of the primary wrongdoer's wrong that the defendant will be held
liable for truly minimal assistance. The same risk is created for a defendant who provided a
great deal of assistance to the primary wrongdoer but only slightly suspected the presence of the
underlying wrong. In short, the judicial test doesn't effectuate its stated goal of preventing
overinclusive liability. Liability would be established more fairly, if at all, by evaluating all of
the elements individually.
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876, cmt. d. (1979).
228. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
229. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
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defendant's intent in providing the assistance. 230 As a result, the
substantiality requirement becomes analogous to the criminal terms
actus reus and mens rea, applied in the context of civil aiding and
abetting.
1. Actus reus
Actus reus is a criminal term of art, defined as "[t]he wrongful
deed that comprises the physical components of a crime and that
generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal
liability," 231 specifically "a forbidden act."2 32 In the civil context of
aiding and abetting, the physical component, or act requirement, is
the defendant actually providing assistance or encouragement. 233 The
substantiality of the assistance speaks to legal causation. Courts and
commentators alike agree that a voluntary action of assistance or
encouragement satisfies the requisite actus reus for civil aiding and
abetting liability. The possibility of silence or inaction giving rise to
aiding and abetting liability, however, makes courts and
234
commentators queasy.
2. Mens rea
Similar to actus reus, mens rea constitutes a criminal term of
art, defined as "[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a
conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a
crime," specifically "criminal intent or recklessness. ' 235 The requisite
mens rea presents perhaps the most significant issue in civil aiding
and abetting liability.
Restatement Section 876(b), as well as the accompanying
comment and illustrations, makes no mention of a requisite mens rea.
In fact, the only mention of required knowledge occurs with respect to

230. Id. at 478.
231. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 37 (7th ed. 1999).
232. Id. The literal translation from the Latin is "guilty act." Id.
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979).
234. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1975);
McNulty, supra note 165, at 16. This topic has generated a substantial volume of writing, from
both courts and commentators, and is outside the scope of this Note; however, it is important to
point out that most of this writing concerned pre-Central Bank worries about civil aiding and
abetting in the securities law area for transactions conducted in the ordinary course of business.
McNulty & Hanson, supra note 165, at 16. Specifically, courts and commentators debated what,
if anything, gave rise to a duty of disclosure. Id. Of course, following Central Bank, many of
these concerns have been put to rest. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
235. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 999 (7th ed. 1999). The literal translation from the Latin is
"guilty mind." Id.

290

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:241

the factual knowledge requirement. The Comment on Clause (b)
alludes to mens rea but only by listing "[defendant's] state of mind" as
the final factor in its list of five variables to be "considered" when
analyzing whether "the assistance or participation by the defendant is
so slight that he is not liable for the act of the other," i.e., legal
causation. Making mens rea a rigid requirement of civil aiding and
abetting, therefore, fundamentally
alters the Restatement's
formulation. That is not to say that requiring a mens rea constitutes
an undesirable addition to the Restatement. In fact, this Section aims
to show that mens rea is a desirable improvement to the formulation
of Restatement Section 876(b) and to identify the proper level of mens
rea to be required.
In the criminal law context, Judge Learned Hand identified
aiding and abetting liability as requiring mens rea on the part of a
defendant, writing that the defendant must "in some sort associate
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that
he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it
succeed." 236 The rationale for aiding and abetting liability in the
criminal and civil contexts are considerably similar: to hold
accountable those who seek to bring about wrongful conduct by
assisting or encouraging its commission. Criminal law generally
requires a mens rea of purposely for aiding and abetting liability. 237
The justification provided for this criminal law requirement is the
reluctance to impose criminal liability upon a defendant without a
showing that his actions of assistance or encouragement were
intended to assist or encourage the primary wrongdoer. This
justification is persuasive and should be applied in tort law as well;
however, the general distinctions between tort and criminal law
justify a lower mens rea requirement in tort law.
In the civil context of aiding and abetting, the requisite state of
mind to establish liability under the judicial test is that the defendant
acted "knowingly," meaning that the defendant knew that he was
providing substantial assistance or encouragement to the primary
tortfeasor to act in a tortious manner. 238 There is no definition of
236. U.S. v. Peoni 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
237. See Hicks v. U.S., 150 U.S. 442, 446 (1893) (Defendant's instruction to the victim to
"take off your hat, and die like a man" may have encouraged the primary actor; however, without
a showing that the defendant intended his statement to have this effect, the defendant cannot be
held liable).
238. See supra Part IV.C. This requisite mental state is what makes aiding and abetting an
intentional tort, as opposed to negligence, which only requires reasonable care. If reasonable
care was sufficient to establish liability, it essentially would make aiding and abetting the same
as negligence. An important result of aiding and abetting being deemed an intentional tort is
the unavailability of liability insurance, which in and of itself serves as a practical limitation on
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"knowingly" in torts; however,
definition is:

the generally

accepted criminal

A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the
element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware
that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element
involves a result of his conduct,
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
239
will cause such a result.

Although both relate to the defendant's knowledge, one must note that
241
mens rea240 is distinct from the Factual Knowledge requirement.
The defendant's knowledge that he is providing assistance or
encouragement to another's action (the mens rea) in no way means the
defendant must also possesses knowledge that the other's act is
wrongful (the Factual Knowledge requirement). 242 They are separate
inquiries, not mutually inclusive. Knowledge of assistance and
knowledge of wrongfulness lack any reasonable dependence upon one
another; therefore, the two should not be considered jointly merely
because of their mutual use of the word "knowledge."
For example, Anne likely may have knowledge that she is
encouraging her husband Paul to "try to get our money back" from
Victor; however, it cannot be assumed that knowledge of this
243
encouragement also means knowledge that Paul will assault Victor.
An attempt to get the money back is the act that Anne is encouraging
Paul to perform. 244 Without a showing that Anne knew that her
encouragement of the attempt to retrieve money would provoke a
breach of duty to Victor, Anne cannot be liable to Victor because Anne
was not "aware of any design or intent on the part of her husband to
[commit the assault]. ' 24 5 In other words, Anne lacked the requisite
knowledge that Paul's act would constitute a breach of duty.

civil aiding and abetting liability because only defendants with assets worth pursuing are likely
to be sued under the civil aiding and abetting theory.
239. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
240. I.e., that the defendant knew he was providing substantial assistance.
241. I.e., the defendant's knowledge that the primary actor's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty. See supra Part V.B.
242. Some commentators have, albeit erroneously, said as much. E.g. Willis, supra note 128,
at 1056 n.92 ("In Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975), the court
altered the test to find that general awareness sufficed but required that the assistance be
knowing. Obviously, if the assistanceis knowing, the defendant knows of the breach.") (emphasis
added).
243. See Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 345, 348 (Md. 1967) ("She asked her husband to try to
get their money back, but she did not say or intimate that he should assault appellant in order to
do so.").
244. Id.
245. Id.
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D. Causation:Murky Waters Ahead
The theory of civil aiding and abetting presents interesting
problems with respect to causation.
Traditionally, the law has
assigned the term "causation" to two different issues: cause-in-fact
and proximate cause. 246 Cause-in-fact refers to the word "causation"
as it is used in common parlance: Was the defendant's negligent
conduct a cause of the plaintiffs injury or not? 247 Proximate cause,
however, refers to the appropriate scope of the defendant's legal
responsibility for his negligent conduct, 248 turning heavily on morals
and policy judgments and having little to do with "causation" in the
ordinary meaning of the word. 249 Keeping the two concepts separate is
important for a thorough understanding of civil aiding and abetting.
1. Cause-in-Fact: What Is SubstantialAssistance?
The substantial factor test mentioned in the Restatement is not
the proper test because it is result-oriented. Rather, the proper test
should evaluate whether the assistance was a substantial factor in
bringing about the primary wrongdoer's conduct. To prevail on a
claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove actual harm caused by the
defendant. 250 Several intentional torts, however, do not require proof
of actual harm, as such torts are "regarded as harmful in
251
themselves."
According to the verbal formulation, the Restatement provides
that the analysis of cause-in-fact for civil aiding and abetting relies
upon the substantial factor test, 252 which declares that all defendants
who are substantial factors in the harm are causes-in-fact. 253 If more
than one force is sufficient to bring about the harm to the plaintiff,
then each force may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing
246. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 167, at 407.
247. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 30, at 209-10; DOBBS, supra note 26, § 167, at 407.
248. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 167, at 407.
249. Id. at 408 ("Proximate cause.., is not about causation at all but about the significance
of the defendant's conduct or the appropriate scope of liability ....).
250. Id. at 47 ("[C]laims for negligence ... always require proof of actual harm"); Id. § 180, at
443 ("To prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the
defendant's negligent conduct was not only a cause in fact of the plaintiffs harm, but also a
proximate or legal cause."); id. § 180, at 443.
251. Id. § 167, at 47 (referencing "trespassory torts," i.e., torts that impact the plaintiffs
freedom, autonomy, or physical security).
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. (1979) ("If the encouragement or
assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a
tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act.").
253. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 171, at 415.
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about such harm. 2 54 In terms used in the above analysis, a defendant
is liable for civil aiding and abetting where the actus reus was a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs harm, 255 assuming all other
elements of liability are satisfied. Thus, the trier of fact need not find
that but-for the defendant's actus reus the plaintiff would have
escaped harm. 256 The actus reus must be a factor in the resulting
harm.257

Although the foregoing explanation is easy to swallow, the
confusion begins when one attempts to apply the principles of the
substantial factor test to the theory of civil aiding and abetting. The
common application of the substantial factor test is in cases of
258
multiple sufficient causes, the classic example being joining fires.
Under the theory of civil aiding and abetting, however, the
encouragement or assistance need not have been sufficient, in and of
itself, to cause the plaintiffs harm. Given that an act of verbal
encouragement may suffice to hold a defendant liable for a physical
battery of the plaintiff, one can see that aiding and abetting liability
extends to conduct that is insufficient to cause the injury, as obviously
verbal encouragement would not batter the plaintiff without the
primary actor's physical action. 259 Thus, while the comment to
Restatement Section 876(b) uses the phrase "substantial factor," the
traditional substantial factor test does not seem directly applicable
due to its result-oriented nature.
The proper test is to evaluate whether the assistance or
encouragement was a substantial factor in bringing about the primary
wrongdoer's wrongful conduct. By focusing upon the substantiality of
the assistance or encouragement by the defendant, courts can avoid
the problem of the traditional substantial factor test because it is clear
that the defendant does not have to be a sufficient cause of the injury
to the plaintiff. In other words, the focus is upon whether the

254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965) ("If two forces are actively operating,
one because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and
each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to
be a substantial factor in bringing it about.").
255. As outlined above, the substantial assistance or encouragement by the defendant is
considered the actus reus, and the plaintiffs harm can be any legally recognized injury. See
supra Part V.C. 1.
256. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 171, at 414-15.
257. As mentioned above, the law of torts requires that the defendant's action actually cause
a legal harm to the plaintiff, unlike the criminal law where an actus reus combined with a mens
rea can suffice to hold the defendant liable without satisfaction of a particular result, i.e., the
crime of attempt. See supranote 250 and accompanying text.
258. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 171, at 415.
259. See supra note 99.

294

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:241

defendant was a substantial factor in causing the primary wrongdoer
to act wrongfully, compared to focusing upon whether the defendant's
conduct, standing alone, was sufficient to cause the resulting wrong to
the plaintiff. This distinction is sensible in the context of aiding and
abetting because the defendant is not the primary wrongdoer and the
focus is upon the defendant's assistance or encouragement of the
primary wrongdoer's wrongful action.
Liability of the defendant may extend beyond the injuries
actually resulting from his encouragement or assistance.
For
example, a defendant may be liable for the entire injury to the
plaintiff, even injury taking place before the defendant's
encouragement or assistance. In Little v. Tingle, the court held the
defendant-encourager liable for all the injuries resulting from the
battery of the plaintiff, including the loss of an eye, regardless of
260
whether the encouragement began before or after the eye was lost.
The Little court explained that the defendant's encouragement made
261
him responsible for the beating as a whole.
In assessing whether the assistance or encouragement was
substantial, courts typically analyze the following six factors: (1) the
nature of the act encouraged, (2) the amount of assistance given by the
defendant, (3) his presence or absence at the time of the tort, (4) his
relation to the primary tortfeasor, (5) his state of mind, and (6) the
duration of the assistance provided. 262 The six factors have been
applied as variables in the analysis, not as requirements. 263 As a
result, the substantiality of the assistance is very fact specific.
The oft-cited Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc.264 provides an
excellent example of encouragement alone sufficing to render a
defendant liable for the primary tortfeasor's actions. In Cobb, the

260. 26 Ind. 168, 168-69 (Ind. 1866).
261. Id. at 168. Perhaps an underlying justification of such a result is the unarticulated
analogy to the doctrine of ratification. See AM. JUR. 2D TORTS § 60 (2001) (footnotes omitted):
Liability in tort may be predicated upon the ratification of a wrongful act after it is
done, where the act benefited, or was done in the interest of, the person adopting the
act, and was ratified with full knowledge of the facts. The liability in such a case is
joint and several.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 100 (1958):

[T]he liabilities resulting from ratification are the same as those resulting from
authorization if, between the time when the original act was performed and when it
was affirmed, there has been no change in the capacity of the principal or third person
or in the legality of authorizing or performing the original act.
262. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Note that the first
five factors come from the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b). The sixth factor
was added by the court in Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484, but has been recognized by other courts.
263. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483.
264. 522 S.W.2d 383 (Ark. 1975).
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court held that a mobile home park security guard could be held liable
for his encouragement of a minor motorist's negligent driving that
resulted in injuries to the plaintiff.265 After a discussion of how fast
the young motorist's 1964 Mercury Comet could "run," 266 the guard
told the young motorist to "take it down to the dairy bar and run it
back up here to see what it will do." 267 The guard warned the young
motorist, telling him "I want you to shut it down before you come over
that hill because there is a gas line or something." 268 The motorist
"came over the hill and kept on coming like there wasn't nothing in his
way." 269 Despite the warning, the young motorist lost control of his
vehicle and began to swerve, hitting the security guard's station
wagon upon which the plaintiff was sitting.2 7 0 The court held that the
nature of the security guard's comments 27 1 and his relationship of
authority to the young motorist 272 presented a question for the jury
regarding the defendant's liability for the motorist's act. 273
2. Proximate Cause: How Far Does Liability Extend?
Another important question is how far civil aiding and abetting
liability extends to other acts committed by the primary wrongdoer.
As discussed above, the scope of a defendant's liability under Section

265. Id. at 388.
266. Id. at 385. The facts indicate that the car had a V-8. Id.
267. Id. at 386.
268. Id. at 385. Apparently there was a worry that the car would need to slow down in order
to avoid hitting the gas line. Id. at 386.
269. Id. at 385.
270. Id. at 385-86.
271. Id. at 387:
The first important fact is that a jury could certainly find [the guard] initiated, by his
words, the sequence of events, or the act (reckless driving) which resulted in the
injuries to [the plaintiff], i.e., [the young motorist] did not suggest that he would like
to show everybody what his automobile could do in the way of speed; to the contrary,
the suggestion came from [the guard].
Recall that "the nature of the act encouraged" by the defendant is one of the five factors listed in
the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(b) (1979). The preceding quote from
Cobb indicates that the nature of the act encouraged (the reckless driving) was important. 522
S.W.2d at 387-88.
272. Id. at 387 ("Also, the jury might well take into consideration [the guard's] position of
authority which could possibly have been a factor influencing [the young motorist] to
demonstrate the speed of his automobile."). Recall that the defendant's "relation to the other" is
one of the five factors listed in the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876(b)
(1979). The court in Cobb found this relationship important, noting that "[t]his was not a case of
one of his fellow students, or young friends, suggesting that he drive his car at high speed, but
rather encouragement from the individual who was in charge of park security, and a person
apparently, from the record held in respect by the young people." Cobb, 522 S.W.2d at 387-88.
273. Id. at 389.
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876(b) extends to other wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer
that were not specifically encouraged by the defendant but that were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant as a result of his
encouragement. 274
The courts seemingly have adopted the
Restatement approach. The resulting general rule is thus: one who
encourages another to commit a tortious act may also be responsible
for other foreseeable acts done by that other person in connection with
275
the intended act.
In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Grim,276 the
Supreme Court of Kansas held a young boy who entered church at
night with companions to obtain soft drinks liable for fire damage
resulting from the failure of two companions to extinguish torches lit
by them to illuminate the premises, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant did not enter the attic. where the fire began or have
anything to do with use of torches. The court reasoned that the boys
broke into the church for the common purpose of obtaining Cokes from
the kitchen and that the need for adequate lighting during the course
of the mission could reasonably be anticipated. 27 7 While Grim
provides a good illustration of the scope of aiding and abetting liability
for other acts in the abstract, the use of Grim as authority on this
point is problematic because the court perpetrated an incredible
assault upon the idea of keeping the various theories of concerted
278
action liability distinct.
Halberstam v. Welch provides an excellent example of a
defendant who assisted wrongful conduct and was held liable for other
acts that were reasonably foreseeable in connection with the wrongful
act assisted. In Halberstam, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held a
non-participant in a burglary that resulted in a murder civilly liable
as an accomplice for over $5 million in resulting damages. The
primary issues in the case were:
[1] what kind of activities of a secondary defendant (Hamilton) will establish vicarious
liability for tortious conduct (burglaries) by the primary wrongdoer (Welch), and [2] to

274. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
275. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (Kan. 1968).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. It has been pointed out that the holding in Grim rested upon a civil conspiracy theory as
well. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("In sum, the Grim court was
invoking both civil conspiracy and aiding-abetting theories on the ground there was both an
agreement to break in to get soft drinks and substantial aid through actual participation in the
break-in."). In addition, the language used by the court in Grim also indicates the court's
underlying application of joint enterprise principles. 440 P.2d at 625-26. Despite the confusion
of theories of liability, the Grim case provides a good illustration of the scope of a civil aider and
abettor's liability for other acts.
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what extent will the secondary defendant be liable for another tortious act (murder)
committed by the primary tortfeasor while pursuing the underlying tortious activity.

Judge Wald, writing for the court, held that Hamilton was
civilly liable both for conspiracy and aiding and abetting, taking care
to distinguish the two forms of liability. During the course of
burglarizing the Halberstam home, a man named Welch fatally shot
Dr. Michael Halberstam.
Welch and Hamilton had been living
together for the five years prior to the shooting. Judge Wald noted
that the Welch and Hamilton lived a very luxurious lifestyle, owning a
one million dollar home in Great Falls, Virginia, complete with two
Mercedes-Benz cars and a housekeeper, as well as a second home in
Minnesota.2 7 9 The couple's lifestyle warrants mention because when
the couple met just five years earlier, Welch had little more than a
Monte Carlo, the change in his pocket, and the gun in his hand. 280
Welch's career as a burglar fueled the couple's rise from rags to riches.
Hamilton claimed to have never known the truth about Welch's
career; however, the record supported the district court's findings that
Hamilton both knew of and substantially supported the criminal
activities of Welch that resulted in the couple's wealth. 28 1 In so
holding, Judge Wald wrote:
As to the inference of Hamilton's knowledge of Welch's criminal doings, it defies
credulity that Hamilton did not know that something illegal was afoot. Welch's pattern
of unaccompanied evening jaunts over five years, his boxes of booty, the smelting of gold
and silver, the sudden influx of great wealth, the filtering of all transactions through
Hamilton except payouts for goods, Hamilton's collusive and unsubstantiated treatment
of income and deductions on her tax forms, even her protestations at trial that she knew
absolutely nothing about Welch's wrongdoing-combine to make the district court's

279. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 475-76. The couple's Great Falls home also had a basement
with about fifty boxes, which contained "approximately three thousand stolen items-antiques,
furs, jewelry, silverware, and various household and personal effects." Id. at 476. Hamilton
conceded awareness of the boxes, but claimed, of course, that she had never seen their contents
and that she did not go down to the basement often. Id. Conveniently, Hamilton provided the
police with a key to Welch's locked basement study when they searched the home. Id.
280. Hamilton met Welch in the parking lot of her apartment complex, and at the time,
Welch literally had a gun in his hand and possessed minimal assets other than his Monte Carlo
and the change in his pocket. Id. at 475.
281. Id. at 486 (citations omitted) (alterations in original):
First, the district court found that Hamilton "knew full well the purpose of [Welch's]
evening forays and the means" he used to acquire their wealth. Second, the district
court inferred an agreement-that "[she] was a willing partner in his criminal
activities." Third, the district court pointed to various acts by Hamilton (e.g., typing
transmittal letters for the ingot sales, handling the payments and accounts,
maintaining all financial transactions solely in her name), and concluded that they
were performed knowingly to assist Welch in his illicit trade: "Disposing of the loot
was the principal business in which Welch and Hamilton engaged while at home.
Hamilton worked as secretary and recordkeeper of their transactions .... " [I]n its
conclusions of law, the court noted Hamilton "knowingly and willingly assisted in
Welch's burglary enterprise."
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inference that she knew he was engaged in illegal activities acceptable, to say the
28 2
least.

As for the scope of Hamilton's civil liability as an accomplice,
the court held that Hamilton's assistance to Welch's criminal
enterprise properly warranted her civil liability as an accomplice to
Dr. Halberstam's murder, clarifying that liability did not require her
to know the specific criminal behavior (burglary) in which Welch was
engaged because "it was enough that she knew he was involved in
some type of personal property crime at night-whether as a fence,
burglar, or armed robber made no difference-because violence and
'28 3
killing is a foreseeable risk in any of these enterprises.
In Hirschman v. Emme, 2 4 the court upheld a verdict finding
the defendants liable because their acts and conduct encouraged,
instigated, and incited the primary wrongdoer's battery of the
plaintiff.28 5 Mr. Julius Emme was charged with vicarious liability for
his nephew Theodore Emme's assault of the plaintiff, Mr. Hirschman.
Hirschman, "an inoffensive Hebrew peddler," was traveling along a
28 6
public highway in a peddler's wagon, drawn by a single horse.
Along the same highway, Julius Emme, described as "a man of mature
years" and "an ex justice of the peace," was entertaining at his home,
with guests who "were more or less intoxicated. '28 7 Several of the
younger guests rushed out to stop the plaintiff.288 "The young men the
commenced to have 'sport with the Jew,' as some witnesses expressed
it. '' 289 During their sport, Julius Emme "secured a rail 10 feet long,
and ran it through the hind wheels of the wagon, between the spokes,
joining at the time in the laughter of his guests. '290 As the plaintiff
would remove the obstruction from one wheel, another one would be
obstructed. 291 As the plaintiff removed the large wooden rail for the
final time, Theodore Emme struck the unsuspecting plaintiff on the
292
head with a club, badly and permanently injuring the plaintiff.

282. Id. at 486 (initial emphasis added, other emphasis original). With respect to the payout
for goods, the court was highlighting the fact that Hamilton was keeping all the business records
and must have realized at some point that there was no cost of goods sold. Id. at 475-76.
283. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
284. 83 N.W. 482 (Minn. 1900).
285. Id. at 483.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. (defendant Rohling painted red both the horse's forehead and the end of the wagon;
another person braided the horse's tail with weeds).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.

2005]

CIVIL AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY

299

Despite a showing that none of the parties intended to injure the
plaintiff when the hazing commenced and that the plaintiff so
understood it, the court recognized that "the fact remains that one act
induced and was followed by another, until the last one culminated in
the serious injury of the plaintiff."293 The court reasoned that the
defendants' conduct "naturally tended to incite a hot-headed and
somewhat intoxicated youth to go to extremes in the gentle pastime of
294
Jew-baiting, in which the defendants had taken an active part."
The court further reasoned:
Julius Emme was the host, the man of mature years, the sometime local magistrate;
and it is not to be doubted that a word from him would have restrained the sportive but
unlawful onset upon the plaintiff, nor can it be reasonably questioned that 2his
active
95
participation therein was one of the inducing causes of Theodore Emme's acts.

VI. CONCLUSION

The court in Halberstam essentially said that it does not
matter how the civil aiding and abetting test is formed because every
variation means the same thing. This Note disagrees. As the
foregoing Sections have demonstrated, it clearly does matter how the
test is formulated. In this vein one might recall the famous case of
Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Road,296 where Justice Cardozo and
Justice Andrews battled strenuously regarding the role of duty and
proximate cause in negligence. The formulation of negligence was
extremely important to both Justices and the argument has proceeded
throughout opinions across the nation ever since Mrs. Palsgrafs
appeal to New York's highest court. In the heated debate, Justice
Andrews made a famous statement that is particularly poignant for
'297
this Note: "This is not a mere dispute as to words.
Here, too, the formulation and application of the test for civil
aiding and abetting liability is not a mere dispute as to words. The
formulation chosen significantly affects the scope of liability.
Therefore, courts should fully consider the changes that have been
made to the verbal formulations, especially given the questionable
reasons for making such changes.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id.
Id.
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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